Tag Archives | Transparency

A Roadmap for Inequality Research: Transparency, Intersectionality, and Multiple Measures of Race

Emma Williams-Baron, Aliya Saperstein

Sociological Science July 9, 2026
10.15195/v13.a32


Most quantitative studies of U.S. inequality rely on single measures of race and do not transparently describe them. However, inconsistencies between measures can yield conclusions that differ both substantively and statistically. We ask: when faced with multiple ways to categorize respondents, how should researchers choose? We conduct intersectional analyses of five inequality outcomes, using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which offers several measures of self-identification and external classification. Strikingly, we find the survey’s screener race variable, ubiquitous in prior research, is never empirically preferred based on model fit across outcomes spanning the labor market (wages, salary, and unemployment), health (depression), and education (school discipline). Instead, the top-performing measure varies by gender, outcome, and fit statistic. The range of potential researcher decisions and the absence of a clear gold-standard highlights the need for greater transparency and more thoughtful decision-making when researchers operationalize race—whether racial categorization is central to the analysis or included primarily as a control variable. To that end, we offer a roadmap of key considerations inequality researchers can consult when designing their approach.

Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.


Emma Williams-Baron: Department of Sociology, Stanford University. E-mail: emmajwb@stanford.edu.
Aliya Saperstein: Department of Sociology, Stanford University. E-mail: asaper@stanford.edu.

Acknowledgments: We are grateful to our colleagues in the gender and inequality workshops at Stanford University for their helpful comments and suggestions, and to Steve McClaskie for responding to inquiries about the NLSY. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2024 American Sociological Association annual meeting and at a 2023 conference on racial inequality in education research hosted by NWEA in Portland, OR. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under Grant No. DGE-1656518. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.


Supplemental Materials

Reproducibility Package: Data and code for reproducing the results presented in this article are publicly
available in an Open Science Framework repository here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/K3RZT. Data may also be accessed through the NLSY Investigator site at: https://www.nlsinfo.org/investigator.


  • Citation: Williams-Baron, Emma, Aliya Saperstein. 2026. “A Roadmap for Inequality Research: Transparency, Intersectionality, and Multiple Measures of Race” Sociological Science 13: 825-863.
  • Received: September 20, 2025
  • Accepted: May 18, 2026
  • Editors: Arnout van de Rijt, Kristian B. Karlson
  • DOI: 10.15195/v13.a32


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Social Status and the Moral Acceptance of Artificial Intelligence

Patrick Schenk, Vanessa A. Müller, Luca Keiser

Sociological Science October 29, 2024
10.15195/v11.a36


The morality of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a contentious topic in academic and public debates. We argue that AI’s moral acceptance depends not only on its ability to accomplish a task in line with moral norms but also on the social status attributed to AI. Agent type (AI vs. computer program vs. human), gender, and organizational membership impact moral permissibility. In a factorial survey experiment, 578 participants rated the moral acceptability of agents performing a task (e.g., cancer diagnostics). We find that using AI is judged less morally acceptable than employing human agents. AI used in high-status organizations is judged more morally acceptable than in low-status organizations. No differences were found between computer programs and AI. Neither anthropomorphic nor gender framing had an effect. Thus, human agents in high-status organizations receive a moral surplus purely based on their structural position in a cultural status hierarchy regardless of their actual performance.
Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Patrick Schenk: Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne
E-mail: patrick.schenk@unilu.ch

Vanessa A. Müller: Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne
E-mail: vanessa.mueller2@unilu.ch

Luca Keiser: gfs.bern
E-mail: luca.keiser@gfsbern.ch

Acknowledgements: We thank Gabriel Abend, Michael Sauder, the editor of Sociological Science, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Congress of the Academy of Sociology in Bern, Switzerland, and the Conference of the European Sociological Association in Porto, Portugal.

Funding: This study was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number 100017_200750/1).

Supplemental Materials

Reproducibility Package: A reproduction package with data, codebook, and statistical code is available through the following link: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13850548.

  • Citation: Schenk, Patrick, Vanessa A. Müller, Luca Keiser. 2024. “Social Status and the Moral Acceptance of Artificial Intelligence.” Sociological Science 11: 989-1016.
  • Received: August 20, 2024
  • Accepted: September 29, 2024
  • Editors: Ari Adut, Stephen Vaisey
  • DOI: 10.15195/v11.a36


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