Tag Archives | Mechanisms

How to Make a Functionalist Argument

Andrés Castro Araújo, Nicolás Restrepo Ochoa

Sociological Science August 14, 2025
10.15195/v12.a20


Sociologists have an awkward relationship with functionalist explanations. Despite having declared “functionalism” to be obsolete, some form of functionalist argument still remains cryptically present in much substantive research. We argue that the resulting inability to talk plainly about functions is a major hindrance for theory building in the discipline. As such, this article has two goals. The first is disambiguation. What does it mean to attribute a function to something? We answer this question by elaborating on the distinction between proper functions (responding to why-is-it-there questions) and role functions (responding to how-does-it-work questions). The second is to introduce a typology of functional arguments that builds upon this distinction, allowing us to recast “functionalism” as a set of general explanatory strategies and not as a substantive theory about society. Importantly, these forms of argument are not burdened by the problems with the organicist framework that many sociologists associate with functionalism.
Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Andrés Castro Araújo: Department of Sociology, Duke University. E-mail: andres.castro.araujo@duke.edu.
Nicolás Restrepo Ochoa: Department of Anthropology, University of California-Davis. E-mail: nrestrepoochoa@ucdavis.edu.

Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Kieran Healy, Braulio Güémez, Turgut Keskintürk, Juan R. Loaiza, Gunnar Babcock, Elizaveta Sheremet, Martin Ruef, and Steve Vaisey for all the helpful feedback given throughout the long amount of time it took to write this.

  • Citation: Araújo, Andrés Castro, and Nicolás Restrepo Ochoa. 2025. “How to Make a Functionalist Argument” Sociological Science 12:456-485.
  • Received: May 1, 2025
  • Acceptedd: June 9, 2025
  • Editors: Arnout van de Rijt, Elizabeth Bruch
  • DOI: 10.15195/v12.a20

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Stylized Facts and Experimentation

Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss

Sociological Science, October 12, 2016
DOI 10.15195/v3.a39

In this comment, we clarify and extend Hirschman’s (2016) discussion of “stylized facts.” Our focus is on the relationship between stylized facts and experimentation. Given the continued increase in experimentation across the social sciences, we think that it is important to consider the exact role that experiments play in the production and testing of stylized facts. We make three related contributions here. First, we describe how experiments can both provide new evidence to support existing stylized facts as well as produce new stylized facts. Second, we argue that the stylized facts produced through experimentation differ from other stylized facts. Third, we extend Hirschman’s (2016) definition of “stylized facts” so that it distinguishes between those that describe correlation relationships and those that describe causal relationships.

Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Charles Crabtree: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
Email: ccrabtr@umich.edu

Christopher J. Fariss: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
Email: cjf0006@gmail.com

Acknowledgements: We thank Volha Chykina and Rose McDermott for their helpful comments.

  • Citation: Crabtree, Charles, and Christopher J. Fariss. 2016. “Stylized Facts and Experimentation.” Sociological Science 3: 910-914.
  • Received: August 12, 2016
  • Accepted: August 28, 2016
  • Editors: Jesper Sørensen, Sarah Soule
  • DOI: 10.15195/v3.a39


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