Tag Archives | Hiring

Do Some Countries Discriminate More than Others? Evidence from 97 Field Experiments of Racial Discrimination in Hiring

Lincoln Quillian, Anthony Heath, Devah Pager, Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, Fenella Fleischmann, Ole Hexel

Sociological Science, June 17, 2019
10.15195/v6.a18


Comparing levels of discrimination across countries can provide a window into large-scale social and political factors often described as the root of discrimination. Because of difficulties in measurement, however, little is established about variation in hiring discrimination across countries. We address this gap through a formal meta-analysis of 97 field experiments of discrimination incorporating more than 200,000 job applications in nine countries in Europe and North America. We find significant discrimination against nonwhite natives in all countries in our analysis; discrimination against white immigrants is present but low. However, discrimination rates vary strongly by country: In high-discrimination countries, white natives receive nearly twice the callbacks of nonwhites; in low-discrimination countries, white natives receive about 25 percent more. France has the highest discrimination rates, followed by Sweden. We find smaller differences among Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the United States, and Germany. These findings challenge several conventional macro-level theories of discrimination.
Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Lincoln Quillian: Department of Sociology, Northwestern University
E-mail: l-quillian@northwestern.edu

Anthony Heath: Centre for Social Investigation, Nuffield College
E-mail: anthony.heath@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Devah Pager: Deceased, formerly Department of Sociology, Harvard University

Arnfinn H. Midtbøen: Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway
E-mail: a.h.midtboen@samfunnsforskning.no

Fenella Fleischmann: Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University
E-mail: F.Fleischmann@uu.nl

Ole Hexel: Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, and Observatoire Sociologique du Changement, Sciences Po, Paris, France
E-mail: ole.hexel@u.northwestern.edu

Acknowledgements: We have received financial support for this project from the Russell Sage Foundation and the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. We thank Larry Hedges for methodological advice. We dedicate this article to Devah Pager, who learned a little from us and taught us much more.

  • Citation: Quillian, Lincoln, Anthony Heath, Devah Pager, Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, Fenella Fleischmann, and Ole Hexel. 2019. “Do Some Countries Discriminate More than Others? Evidence from 97 Field Experiments of Racial Discrimination in Hiring.” Sociological Science 6: 467-496.
  • Received: March 7, 2019
  • Accepted: April 23, 2019
  • Editors: Jesper Sørensen, Olav Sorenson
  • DOI: 10.15195/v6.a18


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The Labor Market Value of Taste: An Experimental Study of Class Bias in U.S. Employment

Kyla Thomas

Sociological Science, September 12, 2018
10.15195/v5.a24


This article investigates cultural forms of class bias in the middle-income U.S. labor market. Results from an audit study of employment discrimination in four U.S. cities reveal that cultural signals of class, when included in résumés, have a systematic effect on the callback rates of women applying to customer-facing jobs. For these women, displays of highbrow taste—the cultural signals of a higher-class background—generate significantly higher rates of employer callback than displays of lowbrow taste—the cultural signals of a lower-class background. Meanwhile, cultural signals of class have no systematic effect on the callback rates of male and/or non–customer-facing job applicants. Results from a survey-experimental study of 1,428 U.S. hiring managers suggest that these differing patterns of employer callback may be explained by the positive effect of higher-class cultural signals on perceptions of polish and competence and their negative effect on perceptions of warmth.
Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Kyla Thomas: Center for Economic and Social Research, University of Southern California
E-mail: kylathom@usc.edu

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Paul DiMaggio for his intellectual guidance and support as well as Viviana Zelizer, Devah Pager, Susan Fiske, David Pedulla, Patrick Ishizuka, René Flores, and participants of the University of Michigan’s Inequality and Family Working Group for their valuable insights and feedback. This research was supported by the Fahs-Beck Fund for Research and Experimentation, Princeton University’s Center for the Study of Social Organization, and an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation/American Council of Learned Societies Dissertation Completion Fellowship.

  • Citation: Thomas, Kyla. 2018. “The Labor Market Value of Taste: An Experimental Study of Class Bias in U.S. Employment.” Sociological Science 5: 562-595.
  • Received: November 17, 2017
  • Accepted: July 15, 2018
  • Editors: Jesper Sørensen, Kim Weeden
  • DOI: 10.15195/v5.a24


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At the Expense of Quality

Brittany M. Bond, Tatiana Labuzova, Roberto M. Fernandez

Sociological Science, June 28, 2018
10.15195/v5.a17


Many organizations use employee referral programs to incentivize employees to refer potential applicants from their social networks. Employers frequently offer a monetary bonus to employees who refer an applicant, and this is often contingent on whether the person is then hired and retained for a given length of time. In deciding whether to refer someone, referrers face a potential role conflict, as they need to balance their motivations for helping connections find job opportunities with concerns regarding their reputations with their employers. To the extent that monetary incentives shift an employee’s considerations away from finding the best matches for the employer, referral bonuses may increase the chances that lower-quality candidates are referred. Using a survey vignette experiment, we find that even a small referral bonus increases the likelihood that referrers will refer lower-quality candidates, and they are more likely to refer people they do not know well. We further discuss theoretical and practical implications regarding the efficiency of incentivized referral programs in producing quality applicant pools for employers.
Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Brittany M. Bond: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
E-mail: bbond@mit.edu

Tatiana Labuzova: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
E-mail: labuzova@mit.edu

Roberto M. Fernandez: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
E-mail: robertof@mit.edu

Acknowledgements: We thank our colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management and elsewhere for their feedback on earlier versions of this article. We have also benefitted from help, advice, and feedback from Matthew Amengual, Rhett Andrew Brymer, Santiago Campero, John Carroll, Emilio Castilla, Minjae Kim, Ezra Zuckerman Sivan, Heather Yang, and participants in the Economic Sociology Working Group at MIT Sloan and the Ninth Annual Meeting of the People and Organizations Conference at The Wharton School.

  • Citation: Bond, Brittany M., Tatiana Labuzova, and Roberto M. Fernandez. 2018. “At the Expense of Quality.” Sociological Science 5: 380-401.
  • Received: March 27, 2018
  • Accepted: April 17, 2018
  • Editors: Jesper Sørensen, Mario Small
  • DOI: 10.15195/v5.a17

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