Appendix

1.1   Additional Details on the Sampling of Study Participants

Three criteria were used to select Milanese neighborhoods to sample from: ethnic diversity, wealth, and urbanity. For ethnic diversity, we examined the distribution of the percentage of foreigners in NILs and selected a reasonable interval around the mean (i.e. 25-75 percentile). We excluded 11 neighborhoods with low diversity between 0 - 5% and 4 neighborhoods with high diversity levels 28-55%.

Second, we wanted to select participants from neighborhoods with relatively similar levels of wealth. The best proxy is the local price of real estate (cost per m2). Again, we looked at the average size (mean= 85m2, min=71m2, max, 126m2) and cost for private usage of property in diverse neighborhoods (as selected above). In addition, we took into account unemployment as another indicator of wealth. The mean unemployment rate across the 83 NILs was 6.9 % with a min of 4.1% and a max of 11.8%. For each of the wealth indicators we cut the tails at 5%. Lastly, we considered population density as we aimed to include neighborhoods with an urban landscape. We thus excluded those with very small population density (unless this is due to a park, train station etc).

We hired a well-known survey company in Milan, Consulmarketing, to conduct the recruitment of participants from these neighborhoods. For Italian participants, they sampled from their existing access panel, following our directives to obtain a balanced sample. The recruitment of our immigrant participants was more difficult and also relied in the end on contacting ethnic community centers (e.g. Filipino churches) and a snowball sampling technique. However, we tried to ensure that participants within the same session did not know each other and also included additional questions of whether participants knew anyone who had previously participated in the study in our post-experimental survey at the end of each session.

1.2 Summary statistics for sample

Table A1: Summary statistics participants

	Italians				
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Age	40.8	13.5	18	65	558
Male	46.4	49.9	0	100	558
Vocational degree or lower	67.9	46.7	0	100	558
University degree	32.1	46.7	0	100	558
Employed	70.4	45.7	0	100	558
	Filipinos				
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Age	37.2	13.6	18	64	140
Male	38.6	48.9	0	100	140
Vocational degree or lower	70.0	46.0	0	100	140
University degree	30.0	46.0	0	100	140
Employed	62.1	48.7	0	100	140
	Moroccans				
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Age	39.5	12.3	18	67	192
Male	74.0	44.0	0	100	192
Vocational degree or lower	88.0	32.6	0	100	192
University degree	12.0	32.6	0	100	192
Employed	22.9	42.1	0	100	192

Note: Demographic characteristics of the participants.

1.3 Models

Table A2: Regression of nationality of the recipient and sociodemographic characteristics of contributor on Dictator Games contributions. Entire sample.

	(1)	
Recipient Nationality		
Italy	ref.	
China	0.37*	(0.22)
Morocco	0.13	(0.17)
Peru	-0.34	(0.24)
Romania	0.09	(0.22)
Philippines	0.17	(0.18)
Sociodemographics		
Italian	ref.	
Filipino	-.21	.18
Moroccan	-.10	.18
Female	-0.12	(0.11)
Social class	-0.00	(0.06)
Age	-0.00	(0.00)
Education	0.12	(0.08)
Constant	3.67***	(0.46)
N	1,642	
R2	0.01	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ Due to missing values on self-reported social class, the sample size reported in this table (N=1,642) is smaller than the total sample of DG decisions (N=1,780). Results remain substantially unchanged when analyzing the entire sample without accounting for social class.

Table A3: Estimated effects on contributions in the Trust Game by nationality and economic and civic activity of the recipient

|	(1)	
Choice of partner	0.33**	(0.16)
Immigrant	-0.27	(0.19)
Leisure Activity	ref.	
Civic Activity	0.56**	(0.23)
Economic Activity	0.51**	(0.22)
Female	0.29*	(0.16)
Age	0.01	(0.01)
Constant	3.84***	(0.51)
N	1,114	
R2	0.02	

Note: Results from linear regressions predicting contributions in the Trust Game as a function of alter's nationality, civic and economic engagement, gender, age and choice treatment. Only Italian participants, 2 rounds (N=1,114). Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Estimated effects on contributions in the Trust Game with an interaction between choice treatment and nationality of the recipient

	(1)	
No choice × Native	ref.	
No choice × Immigrant	-0.06	(0.28)
Choice × Native	0.62*	(0.33)
Choice × Immigrant	0.17	(0.28)
Leisure Activity	ref.	
Civic Activity	0.57**	(0.23)
Economic Activity	0.51**	(0.22)
Female	0.30*	(0.16)
Age	0.01	(0.01)
Constant	3.66***	(0.54)
N	1,114	
R2	0.02	

Note: When Italians choose to interact with another Italian, they tend to contribute more compared to situations in which they are paired with another Italian. Only Italian participants, 2 rounds (N=1,114). Since an Italian participant incorrectly registered as an immigrant starting the software, he was excluded from the trust game. We therefore have 557 Italians participating in the trust games instead of the intended 558. Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A1: Model estimates of the probability to choose an immigrant who likes to watch TV, and immigrant teacher and an Italian teacher over an Italian who likes to watch TV as a partner in the Competence Task for Italians (left panel) and immigrants (right panel).

Note: Estimates of interaction terms from linear regression models predicting partner's choice in the Competence Task. Italians, (N=580) and immigrants (N=332).

Figure A2: Model estimates of the effect of having 2 or more immigrant friends, acquaintances, coworkers, employing an immigrant and having had negative experiences with immigrants on in contributions in the Dictator Game and Trust Game (first 2 panels) and the likelihood of choosing an immigrant in the Trust Game and Competence Task (last 2 panels). All models control for immigration attitudes. Regression models predicting contribution and probability of choosing an immigrant. Only Italian participants (N=384-558).