



# Layered Legacies. How Multiple Histories Shaped the Attitudes of Contemporary Europeans

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**Abstract:** This article introduces the concept of multiple, layered, and interacting histories, which opens four new avenues of research. We can ask which types of institutions or events, such as states, religions, or war, are more likely to leave a historical legacy. We can also explore why only certain states, religions, or wars leave legacies. We can compare the consequences of older and newer layers of history, such as of a series of successor states. Finally, these layers may interact with each other by preserving, neutralizing, or amplifying each other's effects. To illustrate these new research avenues, I use measurements of value orientations as well as generalized trust from the European Social Survey as dependent variables. New data on the history of states as well as the wars fought since 1500 are combined with existing data on the medieval policies of the Church, all coded at the level of 411 European regions. A series of regression models suggests that the political history of states is more consequential for contemporary attitudes than medieval religious policies or wars, that older layers of states can be as impactful as more recent ones, that interactions between layers are frequent, and that modern nation-states are more likely to leave a legacy than other types of polities.

**Keywords:** historical legacies; trust; values; Europe; comparative historical sociology

**Citation:** Wimmer, Andreas. 2023. "Layered Legacies. How Multiple Histories Shaped the Attitudes of Contemporary Europeans." *Sociological Science* 10: 1-46.


**Received:** June 26, 2022

**Accepted:** August 24, 2022

**Published:** February 23, 2023

**Editor(s):** Ari Adut, Gabriel Rossman

**DOI:** 10.15195/v10.a1

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RESEARCHERS from across the social sciences have paid increasing attention to the contemporary legacies of long-gone pasts. Sociologists Hiers, Soehl, and Wimmer (2017), for example, show that the populations of countries with a conflictual and painful history of state formation are more hostile to immigrants today. According to political scientist Woodberry (2012), where Protestant missionaries were active in the colonial dependencies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, democracy has a higher chance to take roots today. Economist Nunn (2008) showed that slave raiding in western Africa left a legacy of distrust that continues to hamper contemporary economic growth. Much of this literature seeks to demonstrate how the states, religions, or violent events of the past have durably shaped institutions, collective cultures, or individual behavioral dispositions and that these survive over long stretches of history and even across major ruptures such as those brought about by conquest or independence.

The literature on historical legacies is increasingly concerned with causal identification, as are many other domains of social science research. To that end, researchers have come up with ever more sophisticated ways of making sure that the *ceteris paribus* conditions hold: that nothing else differs between two regions, populations, generations, or countries except its divergent historical experience. Furthermore, researchers are now called upon not only to show that there is a correlation between the past and the present, but to identify and empirically isolate through which

channels and mechanisms the past exerts its influence on the present: through transmission of certain beliefs or behavioral preferences across generations, through institutional continuity, and so forth.

This article takes a different approach. Rather than showing that a specific past has empirical consequences for the present and through which causal channels, I take a step back from the task of causal identification and ask, How should we think about history from a more encompassing point of view that comprises more than one specific historical entity or episode? Because every history is made up of more than one past, how should we conceive of the succession of institutions, events, or policies that may or may not leave a legacy? More precisely and quite in line with more traditional historiographic approaches, I suggest that we see history as a sequence of stages, each of which modifies the possible legacies left by the previous stage and shape the possibilities of future legacies through path dependency. Seen from this point of view, we can think of history as a process of layering, with previous layers shaping the structure of later layers and later layers determining whether older layers continue to influence the present—not unlike in geology, to which I will turn for analogical inspiration. And similar to geology, the approach developed here is unapologetically descriptive and aimed at disentangling complex endogenous processes, rather than identifying a single cause and its effects.

Conceptualizing history as layered legacies contributes to the literature in four ways: First, it allows us to ask which types of processes are more consequential for the present: is it the history of war and conflict, the exposure to certain religious doctrines or organizations, or the political history of states that succeed each other? Second and relatedly, exploring multiple, layered legacies allows us to move away from the exclusive focus on pasts that *did* leave legacies—a characteristic of the current literature—and to start exploring the conditions under which they do and they don't. Third, I introduce the idea that historical layers affect each other, similar to interaction or moderation effects in other domains of the social sciences, and I offer a threefold typology of such interactions: layers can reinforce and amplify each other's effects, neutralize previous experiences by creating a future independent from the past, or preserve older legacies that continue to shape the present. Fourth, the perspective of layered legacies also allows us to explore the relative importance of older and newer strata of the past and to empirically determine to what extent recency is or is not an important element in the generation of legacies.

In order to make these ideas plausible, I illustrate them with quantitative data from the European Social Survey, which is fielded in 33 countries. As has been the case in previous legacy studies (e.g., Nunn 2008; Becker et al. 2016), I focus on how much contemporary Europeans trust each other as well as how much they embrace conservative or altruistic norms—attitudes that are thought of as consequential for a range of outcomes from the emergence of democracy to economic growth to the rule of law (Henrich, Heine, and Noernzayan 2010). Generalized trust, universalist altruism, and openness to change may have emerged in Western Europe during the early modern period, according to evolutionary psychologist and economists, and set Western Europeans apart from the rest of humanity (making them “WEIRD”: Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich et al. [2010]).

To isolate legacy effects of the history of states, a team of graduate student research assistants coded the political history of the various subnational regions defined by the European Social Survey, producing 411 specific histories that record which of the 80 states that existed over the past 500 years in Europe have governed over which region and for how long. I also use existing data on late medieval Church policies, which are thought to have generated “WEIRD” value orientations. Finally, I assembled a geocoded data set recording the location of battlefields over the past five centuries across the Continent. I use these extensive data to determine whether states, religious policies, or the history of war are more likely to leave legacies; to explore the relative weight of different strata of political history; to illustrate the various ways that past layers of history interact with each other; and to determine which states are more likely to leave an imprint on contemporary attitudes. To repeat, this article does not seek to make a focused argument about a specific legacy or to show through which precise cultural, institutional, or psychological mechanisms it is passed down across generations. It aims at a proof of concept for the idea of multiple, layered legacies, rather than a full empirical exploration of its substantial consequences. I thus also refrain from interpreting how and why legacies affect the three different empirical outcomes in sometimes different ways.

The article is organized in the following way. The next section gives an overview over the most relevant strands of the legacy literature of the past two decades and further specifies what contribution this article hopes to make. The third section introduces the data by describing the units of observation, the dependent variables, and most importantly the coding rules to capture half a millennium of European political history at the regional level.

After introducing the modeling approach, the fourth section evaluates a prominent argument recently made by economists (Schulz et al. 2019), according to which contemporary attitudes are deeply shaped by the policies of the Church during the Middle Ages, which generated more altruistic and trusting collective mentalities where they were effectively implemented. I also test if these mentalities are affected by the history of war and violence, another prominent argument made in the legacy literature. I find that medieval Church policies are indeed associated with contemporary attitudes, whereas this is not the case for the history of wars. The proportion of variance, however, that the Church policies explain at the regional level is rather limited compared with that of the political history of states that ruled over Europe from the early modern period onward. I then present two sets of models that focus on this political history, controlling for basic individual and regional characteristics. In the first set, I start with contemporary states and add layer after layer of predecessor states to the models. In the second set, we begin with the oldest, premodern layer of states and then add more recent strata of successor states. A decomposition of variance shows that older layers of political history are an important part of the overall picture, thus substantiating the idea of multiple, layered legacies that conjointly shape contemporary attitudes.

Having established which type among multiple legacies to focus upon and that these legacies are indeed layered, the fifth section outlines three ways in which subsequent states could shape and modify each other’s legacies. I use geological imagery to exemplify these three types. Each type is then illustrated with

examples of how newer states, according to the statistical models introduced in the previous section, neutralized, preserved, or even amplified previous legacies and how, conversely, earlier legacies predetermine or merely preconfigure later ones or let them develop independently. I then offer a rough estimation of how frequent these three types of mediation effects are in the political history of the past 500 years and show that they occur regularly enough to support the idea of interactions between multiple, layered legacies.

The sixth section explores, in a preliminary and tentative way, the question of which of the 80 states were significantly associated with contemporary values and social trust and how large these associations are. I discuss a series of plausible arguments and submit those to an empirical test where data of sufficient breadth are available. In line with expectations of basic modernization theory, I find that modern, contemporary nation-states (independent of the fact that they are also more recent on average) are more closely associated with values and levels of trust among today's Europeans than are dynastic states, empires, tribal confederacies, or theocracies. More precisely, universal conscription and mandatory education, both features of modern nation-states, seem to be associated with a stronger impact on contemporary attitudes. However, these results are indicative at best, and much more empirical work is needed to understand which states leave legacies and on which attitudes, a task to be addressed by future research.

## Literature Review and Theory

### *Major Strands of the Legacy Literature*

The legacy literature stretches across sociology, political science, and economics (for recent reviews, see Voth 2021; Cirone and Pepinsky 2022). It covers a wide range of outcomes, observed at very different scales, from villages to entire subcontinents. The perhaps most often researched legacies are those left by states, religions, or the history of war and violence.<sup>1</sup> As examples of the former, Mahoney (2010) argues that social and economic developments diverged across the Americas because of the differences between mercantilist and liberal colonial states. According to Wimmer (2018), postcolonial nation-building is influenced by the degree to which indigenous states had emerged before colonization. In the view of Becker et al. (2016), the well-functioning and well-respected Habsburg administration left a legacy of interpersonal trust and lower levels of corruption in Eastern Europe. Exploring the legacies of states will provide the main empirical focus of this article.

Scholars who put the finger on religions include Kuran (2004), who argued that certain features of medieval Islamic law, such as its egalitarian rules of inheritance or the lack of a legal form for corporations, prevented economic development and growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with important consequences for the Middle East today (see also Rubin [2011] and Grosjean [2011]). A long literature in the wake of Weber's ([1905] 2013) seminal study have explored the consequences of the Protestant reformation on a wide range of attitudes and socioeconomic institutions (see Woodberry 2012). The influence of both Islam and Protestantism may or may not represent legacy effects, however, as most regions converted to the

new faiths continue to adhere to it to this day. In these cases, religion represents a cumulative cause (with which we are not concerned here), rather than a legacy effect. Back to legacy effects proper, Henrich and coauthors (e.g., Schulz et al. 2019) focus on the medieval policies of the Roman Church and how these broke up the kinship structures of European societies, allowing the spread of more universalist and altruistic norms that enabled strangers to trust each other. In the empirical analysis below, I will revisit this argument and explore if medieval Church policies are indeed associated with altruism and trust today.

The third of the most often researched legacies is those left by traumatic violence through the memories handed down across generations by perpetrators or victims, affecting contemporary behavior from voting to intergroup relations. Examples are the lynching of African Americans in the U.S. South (Gabriel and Tolnay 2017), antisemitic pogroms in Eastern Europe (Voigtländer and Voth 2012), the forced deportation of Ukrainians (Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017) or Crimean Tatars (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017) under Stalin, the terror of China's cultural revolution (Wang 2021), civilian victimization during the Korean war (Kang and Hong 2017), or civil wars more broadly (Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath 2008). In the empirical analysis below, I will again briefly and partially address possible legacies of collective violence, using newly geocoded data on the geographic location of war battlefields over the past 500 years.

But what makes these three different types of historical phenomena examples of legacies? Although there is no shared definition of the term, recent reviews (Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg 2018) have highlighted many similarities in the underlying understanding. A first element is the idea of continuity of a behavior, a cultural pattern or value, or an institution. Most scholars therefore don't consider as "legacy" when actors build *new* institutions or invent *new* cultural patterns to break the continuity with the past and prevent its recurrence, as, for example, Spain, Italy (Riley and Fernández 2014), or Germany (Giesen 2004) did after fascism. These cases represent a different, "negative" form of historical influence between subsequent layers of history (Riley and Fernández 2014). In the terminology of Mahoney (2000), they belong to the "reactive sequence," rather than the legacy version of historical causation. Similarly, when memories of long-gone pasts are revitalized (see Voth 2021:254–5), we would not want to call this a legacy. For example, the symbols of the Viking past mobilized by contemporary white supremacists (Miller-Idriss 2018) can hardly be interpreted as a "legacy" of the Vikings.

Moreover, not every continuity should be described as a legacy. It is not very meaningful to say, for example, that the Catholic Church of 2020 is a legacy of the Catholic Church of 2010. All legacies are cases of persistence, in other words, but not the other way around. What, then, makes a persistence a legacy? Second and less universally agreed upon, legacies persist across ruptures (Kotkin and Beissinger 2014). The most often studied ruptures are the transition from one state to another (as when an empire fell apart into a series of nation-states) or from one regime to another (as when Communist societies became capitalist democracies). Following this second element of the definition, restoring a regime after a period of revolutionary upheaval (think of the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars)

should perhaps also not be described as a “legacy” of the *ancien régime* because the rupture did not last long enough.

Third, many authors (e.g., Simpser et al. 2018) include path-dependency effects in their definition of legacies. For example, many states expanded their bureaucratic capacity during the nineteenth century if they fought wars they had to finance with domestic taxes because international credit markets had shut down. This put these countries on a continuous path of institutional development that lasts to this day (Queralt 2019; on path dependency, the locus classicus is again Mahoney [2000]). Path dependency thus refers to a legacy effect that was initiated by contingent events (the lack of international credit), followed by a period of institutional reproduction.

The emphasis on contingency is not universally shared, however. Some economic historians (most prominently Engerman and Sokoloff 1994; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000) tie the origins of institutions back to initial conditions such as factor endowments. In the Americas, they argued, places where sugar could be grown with slaves or where large numbers of indigenous groups survived conquest, sharp inequalities emerged and a set of institutions developed that guaranteed their persistence. These institutions, in turn, prevented economic dynamism and growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and thus explain the divergent paths of development north and south of the Rio Grande. Independent of the question of their origin, which for the purposes of this article can be left unresolved, the point to emphasize here is that legacies represent a subcategory of path dependency: they are the paths that lead across a major macro-political rupture.

There is also a small literature on how such path dependency can be broken and thus legacies interrupted. For example, memories of a white supremacist past, crystallized around the practice of lynching, are no longer transmitted to the next generation if immigrants with other memories arrive in large numbers or if institutions change (by integrating schools, for example) and thus disrupt the continuity of memory (Gabriel and Tolnay 2017). Conversely, these memories and the corresponding cultural dispositions may migrate with individuals to new places and thus diffuse the legacy to places with different local histories (O’Connell, Curtis, and DeWaard 2020). Disruption and diffusion, in other words, are important mechanisms through which the causal consequences of the past either disappear or are made more difficult to identify, to the annoyance of legacy researchers. Similarly, but largely ignored in the literature, gradual institutional change also prevents the emergence of legacies. Kathy Thelen and coauthors (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) show how institutions change slowly through processes such as layering (new institutions are introduced without replacing the old ones) or drift (institutions remain but due to a changing environment show different consequences). Institutions that transform in these and other ways cannot produce legacies as their consequences change over time (see also Djelic and Quack 2007). In other words, gradual institutional change prevents legacies.

Most of the legacy literature, however, has evidently focused on empirical cases where legacies have not been disrupted or prevented and are easy to observe. Correspondingly, it has been preoccupied with identifying and classifying a series of causal mechanisms through which elements of the past persist into the present. Following Simpser and coauthors (2018), the three most important are continuities



of (1) configurations of power (e.g., an alliance between mercantilists and state bureaucrats in Latin America; see Mahoney [2010]), (2) cultural patterns that shape individual goals, expectations, and behavior and are transmitted across generations (such as the low levels of trust brought about by slavery; see Nunn [2008]), and finally, (3) the persistence of institutions across major ruptures (e.g., civil society organizations introduced by Protestant missionaries that survive into the postcolonial period; see Woodberry [2012]).<sup>2</sup>

It is now standard to ask researchers to provide not only evidence for the existence of continuity, but also the specific transmission channels that are thought to carry the past into the present. A variety of research designs have emerged to substantiate the claim that a contemporary pattern represents an echo from the past—and not a response to a continuing functional or adaptive necessity, the effect of another causal factor that was present in the past as much as in the present (the omitted variable problem), or a simple reinvention of a long-forgotten practice. The most common strategies (for a more comprehensive overview, see Cirone and Pepinsky [2022]) to give legacy arguments causal teeth are instrumental variables approaches (most famously Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001]); difference in difference designs, for example, by studying cohorts born before and after an event (Kang and Hong 2017); regression discontinuity approaches using former state boundaries (Becker et al. 2016); or matching designs with geographically close pairs of towns or villages, of which only one was exposed to a historical “treatment” (e.g., the medieval pogroms in Voigtländer and Voth [2012]).

As far as I can see, this increasingly sophisticated legacy literature is focused on the legacy effects of a single past. This has two implications. First, in a classic case of publication bias (briefly mentioned by Voth [2021:256]), the literature has so far not looked and why certain pasts leave no legacies whereas others do. Second and relatedly, there is little consideration of the fact that history consists of multiple pasts that follow upon each other, such as multiple successor states leading (to give a European example) from the Roman Empire through various medieval kingdoms and theocracies to the land-based empires and absolutist states of the early modern period to the contemporary nation-states. In other words, a more complete understanding of legacies demands that we take multiple layers of history into account. It may very well be that lower layers of history leave or don't leave legacies depending on the next layer of history; conversely, more recent layers of history could leave a legacy or not depending on how the preceding layer prepared the historical grounds. This article suggests that it is time for the legacy literature to begin theoretically and empirically considering the complexity generated by multiple, layered legacies.

### *History as Layering*

Wittenberg (2015) makes a first step in this direction by introducing the idea of multiple layers of history, even if he does not consider the interactions between them. Focusing on Eastern Europe, he distinguishes a pre-Communist past, the Communist period, and the contemporary period. This allows him to identify two types of legacies: continuity between Communism and the contemporary period on

the one hand and between the pre-Communist era, Communism, and the present on the other hand. In this second type, the pattern of the pre-Communist era is visible during both the Communist and the post-Communist periods. He further discusses a third theoretically possible type, generated by a pattern that characterized the pre-Communist period, disappeared during the Communist period, and resurfaced in the post-Communist era. In our understanding, however, this would not count as a legacy because of the lack of continuity between the pre-Communist and the Communist period (the path dependency is broken).

The insight that I retain from Wittenberg's simple schema is that we need to go beyond one-layered legacies. I suggest introducing geological metaphors of layering, analogizing the legacies of past states to geological strata. The overall surface structure of a landscape corresponds to the structures of a contemporary society, as captured, for example, by a large-scale survey such as the European Social Survey. In geology, we don't know how the surface of the earth looked five million years ago. All we have is the legacies left behind by the earth's history, which we can explore by drilling down into the ground and analyzing the strata under the surface, their composition, their thickness, their shape. In the social sciences as well, the more recent the period, the richer and more systematic the information we have about it. To illustrate, there were no surveys in 1900, 1800, 1700, and so forth, but perhaps the verbatim transcripts from the trial of a single person or the diaries of a series of individuals. As in geology, however, we do know what the previous history looked like, for example, which historical states preceded the current ones, for how many years, what their political and social structures looked like, et cetera—the equivalent of drilling a hole into the earth and analyzing the structure of strata and their composition. We can then explore whether this past indeed left a legacy on the present, similarly to geologists exploring if a previous sediment left a mark on the surface topography of the current landscape.

The analogy has its limits, however. Geologists are mostly interested in establishing the structure of subsequent layers. They are historians of the earth, in other words. Most social scientists are less interested in historical sequences per se and more interested in the consequences for the present, with the important exception of historically oriented sociologists who study the past in its own right. In other words, most social scientists are topographers, rather than geologists. Furthermore, it is much harder for social scientists to determine if a historical state indeed left a legacy, whereas geologists simply drill down to see what the composition and shape of a lower layer looks like. History doesn't leave material traces in quite the same way as does geology, greatly complicating the study of legacies.

To explore the idea of multiple, layered legacies and to study how they moderate each other's effects on the past, we first need to empirically describe the entire universe of possible legacy-generating institutions and events, rather than focusing on the cases that indeed left a legacy. In other words, we need a new approach to collecting data on the historical past.



## Data

### *Dependent Variables*

But let me first introduce the outcome variables used throughout the article to illustrate the usefulness of the idea of multiple, layered legacies. I rely on three dependent variables derived from the responses to the European Social Survey (ESS). These three dependent variables are associated with a wide range of outcomes, from economic development to democratic stability (see the discussion in Schulz et al. 2019). Two capture basic value orientations, and the third refers to generalized trust between strangers. The three variables are thus related to the most often discussed aspects of contemporary culture and norms in the legacy literature. Given the illustrative nature of the empirical analysis that follows, I will not discuss differences between these three outcomes in a systematic way. Nor will I speculate how the results might differ if we were to focus on other contemporary attitudes such as on gender or religion or democracy.

To generate value scales, survey respondents are asked to identify with a fictitious person who holds a specific value, using a six-point Likert-type scale. This fictitious person thinks, for example, "... that people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching." There are 21 of these questions that load on 10 subvalues, which cluster into four major values, which in turn constitute two major dimensions: conservatism and its opposite, openness to change and innovation; self-enhancement (referring mostly to individual achievement values) and its opposite, self-transcendence (referring mostly to altruistic and universalist orientations).<sup>3</sup> I use the conservatism and the altruism/universalism values for the empirical analysis below, thus capturing both value dimensions. Note that a large body of scholarship has shown that these values are relevant not only to how individuals think about what goals are worth aspiring to in life but also to how they act in the world.<sup>4</sup>

The third dependent variable is composed of the answers to an often-asked question about trust. Respondents can situate themselves on a continuum reaching from the statement "most people can be trusted (=10)" to the opposite statement that "you can't be too careful (=0)." Generalized trust (that is, trust in strangers) is an important resource for societies. There is a long tradition in sociology (stretching back to Gambetta [1988] and Coleman [1988]) and political science (see the review in Nannestad [2008]) showing that trust matters for a range of important outcomes, not the least for economic growth (as demonstrated by economists Algan and Cahuc [2010]).

### *Independent Variables*

To evaluate how the political history of Europe influenced contemporary values and trust, a new data set was created. Because past states rarely map onto contemporary states, we coded history at subnational, regional levels. This allowed us to use a nested research design, in which individuals are nested into regions, the level at which we coded history. The regions are defined by the ESS and differ in their size from country to country. Most countries have multiple levels of regional

differentiation. We used the level for which the ESS reports that the samples are representative, with the exception of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, where we went with more fine-grained regional divisions that are important to capture divergent historical trajectories, even if this may result in some cases in smaller regional samples.<sup>5</sup> Because I am running multilevel models, these small numbers should not influence the estimates in systematic ways (see Gelman and Hill 2006:275–6). In total, the data set contains approximately 160,000 individuals nested into 411 regions, which are in turn nested into 33 countries, from Russia in the east to Portugal in the west, from Iceland in the north to Greece in the south.

How did we code the past 500 years of history for these 411 regions? To arrive at a list of relevant states, we used existing compendia as well as a series of historical maps such as the Georeferenced Historical Vector Data from EurAtlas as a starting point.<sup>6</sup> To simplify the task, we only took into account states that lasted more than 60 years (or two generations) before the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1816 or that lasted 15 years thereafter (thus disregarding the Napoleonic conquest of much of Europe as well as the Nazi occupations, despite their possible impact). In order for a state to be considered ruling over a region, at least 33 percent of its territory would have to be governed by that state. This means that a region could have been governed by as many as three states during the same year.

For each region, we established its political history since 1500, noting the start and end year of governance by a particular historical or contemporary state, using historical maps referring to territorial changes and their timing for each of these states over time. If a state changed its internal structure completely (such as Austria after the fall of the Habsburg dynasty and the loss of almost all of its non-German domains), we treated this as the emergence of a new state. In order not to overwhelm the data set and statistical models with a large number of very small polities, we aggregated the duchies, principalities, archbishoprics, or earlships of pre-unification Germany, Italy, and Ireland into “small Italian/German/Irish states.”

We deviated from these coding principles in two ways: First, we were also interested in the possible legacies of earlier states that had existed before the onset of the early modern period. We limited this analysis of pre-1500 polities, however, to the larger or possibly more consequential ones: the Roman Empire, the Caliphate of Córdoba on the Iberian peninsula, the early medieval Carolingian Empire in central Europe, and the Byzantine Empire around 1050 (the relevant period for Córdoba and the Carolingian state as well). Second, we coded if a region contained an independent city-state as recognized by the Holy Roman Empire during the medieval and early modern period. We did this because according to one of the most eminent comparative sociologists studying the cultural and political legacies of the past in Europe, Stein Rokkan (Flora, Kuhnle, and Urwin 1999), city-states represent one of the most distinguishable and consequential form of political organization during that period (see also the more recent research on the legacies left by Italian city-states, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [2016]).

This procedure resulted in a list of 80 historical and contemporary states, including well-known polities such as the Habsburg or Ottoman Empires and less-well-

known ones such as the Duchy of Pomerania or the Astrakhan Khanate. Table 1 lists these states.

To illustrate how we coded the sequence of states ruling over particular regions, let us take a look at perhaps the most complicated history of Europe, that of Ukraine. Table 2 lists, for each ESS region of that country, the succession of states that ruled over them, from the oldest ones (the Kingdoms of Hungary and pre-partition Poland) through the middle strata (such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires) all the way to contemporary Ukraine.

Next, I discuss the data sources used to explore if the history of violence matters for contemporary attitudes. Many different forms of violence have been discussed in the legacy literature, as mentioned above. Some of these forms are more particular to certain areas of Europe. Antisemitic pogroms are more frequent in the east, for example, at least during the modern period. But international and civil wars have touched many corners of the Continent. I therefore generated new data on the history of war at the regional level, based on a massive, three-volume encyclopedia of war battles that are mentioned by at least two independent sources (Jaques 2007). After geocoding all the battlefield locations listed since 1500 and identifying ESS regions on the basis of these geocodes, I created a cumulative count variable of the number of battlefields of either civil or international wars in each region of the ESS. The maximum number of battles fought in a region over the past 500 years is 47. About a third of Europeans live in regions where no battle took place during the past five centuries. To see if more recent battles have more profound effects on contemporary attitudes, I also created a battle count weighted by the average recency of these battles. The results remain substantially identical. Obviously, both measurements have their limitations, as they don't take into account how destructive (and thus impactful) a battle was.

To evaluate the possible role of the medieval family policies of the Church, I rely on the extensive data set assembled by Schulz and coauthors (2019), which is also coded at the level of ESS regions. They focused on the presence of bishoprics and thus the degree of exposure of the local population to the policies of the Church between 550 and the year 1500. I use all their measures, defined as the cumulative presence of bishops' seats within various geographic radiuses or, in one alternative measure, as the average presence of a bishop's seat over this time period. Second, I also use their data on proximity to monasteries, which played a crucial role in the medieval life of Europeans. These data are available separately for each of the main monastic orders. I also created an integrated, cumulative count for monasteries of any type.

**Table 1:** Historical and contemporary states ruling over Europe from late antiquity to 2000

Roman Empire	Kingdom of Spain	Khanate of Kazan	Republic of Estonia (pre-USSR)
Carolingian Empire	Kingdom of Navarre	Nogai Horde	Republic of Estonia (post-USSR)
Caliphate of Córdoba	Kingdom of Portugal (before Spanish interlude)	Khanate of Sibir	Republic of Latvia (pre-USSR)
Byzantine Empire	Kingdom/Republic of Portugal (after Spanish interlude)	Grand Duchy of Moscow / Tsardom of Russia / Russian Empire	Republic of Latvia (post-USSR)
Independent city-state	Duchy of Lorraine	USSR / Russian Federation	Republic of Lithuania (pre-USSR)
Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg	Duchy of Savoy	Small German states before unification	Republic of Lithuania (post-USSR)
Duchy of Pomerania	Kingdom of Sardinia (before Napoleon)	Brandenburg-Prussia / Kingdom of Prussia	Republic of Slovenia
Kingdom of Poland (pre-partition)	Kingdom of Sardinia (after Napoleon)	German Empire / Weimar Republic / Federal Republic of Germany	Czech Republic
Republic of Poland	Kingdom of France / French Republic	Kingdom of Bohemia	Slovak Republic
Mamluk Egypt	State of the Church (Papal States)	Kingdom of Hungary	Principality/Kingdom/ Republic of Albania (Albania)
Safavid Empire	Northern Italian city-states and duchies	Hungary	Republic of Croatia
Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman	Kingdom of Naples	Kingdom of Bavaria	Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes / Kingdom of Yugoslavia / Yugoslavia
Livonian Confederation	Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	Kingdom of Württemberg	Republic of Kosovo
Grand Duchy of Lithuania	Ottoman Empire	Kingdom of Scotland	Republic of Cyprus
State of the Teutonic Order	Turkey	Kingdom of England / United Kingdom	Ukraine
Irish Earldoms and Lordships	Archduchy of Austria / Austrian Empire / Austria-Hungary (Habsburg Empire)	Kingdom of Greece / Hellenic Republic (Greece)	Kingdom of Belgium
Ireland	Republic of Austria	Kingdom/Republic of Italy	Republic of Finland
Prince-Bishopric of Liège	Kingdom of Sweden	Kingdom/Republic of Bulgaria	Kingdom of Norway
Burgundian Netherlands	Kingdom of Denmark	Kingdom of Romania / Romania	Swiss Confederation
United Provinces / Kingdom of the Netherlands	Astrakhan Khanate	Republic of Czechoslovakia	Kingdom/Republic of Iceland

**Table 2:** Sequence of states ruling over Ukraine’s regions since 1500

Region name	Stratum E	Stratum E or D	Stratum C or D	Stratum C or D	Stratum C or D	Stratum C	Stratum C	Stratum B	Stratum A
Crimea, Autonomous Republic	Kingdom of Hungary	Kingdom of Poland	Grand Duchy of Lithuania	Ottoman Empire	Habsburg Empire	Kingdom of Romania / Romania	Republic of Czechoslovakia	Grand Duchy of Moscow / Tsardom of Russia / Russian Empire; USSR	Ukraine
Vynnytska oblast			1360–1793	1441–1783				1783–1991	1991–today
Volynska oblast			1380–1795					1793–1991	1991–today
Dnipropetrovska oblast			1569–1667					1795–1991	1991–today
Donetska oblast				1475–1783				1654–1991	1991–today
Zhytomyrska oblast			1360–1795					1667–1991	1991–today
Zakarpatska oblast	895–1526			1570–1699	1526–1918		1919–1945	1783–1991	1991–today
Zaporizska oblast								1945–1991	1991–today
Ivano-Frankivska oblast		1392–1569	1569–1772	1475–1792	1772–1918			1667–1991	1991–today
Kyivska oblast			1360–1667					1922–1991	1991–today
Kirovogradska oblast			1360–1667					1667–1991	1991–today
Luganska oblast								1667–1991	1991–today
Lvivska oblast		1392–1569	1569–1772		1772–1918			1667–1991	1991–today
Mykolaivska oblast			1360–1569	1475–1792				1667–1991	1991–today
Odeska oblast			1360–1569	1484–1791				1667–1991	1991–today
Poltavska oblast			1360–1667					1791–1991	1991–today
Rivenska oblast			1360–1793					1667–1991	1991–today
Sumska oblast			1350–1569					1793–1991	1991–today
Terнопil'ska oblast		1392–1569	1380–1772		1772–1918			1547–1991	1991–today
Kharkivska oblast								1922–1991	1991–today
Khersonska oblast				1475–1783				1547–1991	1991–today
Khmel'nitska oblast		1392–1569	1360–1793					1793–1991	1991–today
Cherkasska oblast			1360–1793					1793–1991	1991–today
Chernovytska oblast				1711–1812	1775–1918	1918–1940		1812–1991	1991–today
Chernigivska oblast			1353–1569					1793–1991	1991–today
Kyiv city			1360–1667					1503–1991	1991–today
								1667–1991	1991–today

## Legacies of Religion, War, and Political History

### *Modeling Approach and Control Variables*

To take into account the nested nature of the data, where each individual is situated in one of the 411 regions, I specify the following multilevel linear regression model:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \delta Z_j + \beta X_i + \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

for  $i = 1, \dots, 156,000$  individuals and  $j = 1, \dots, 411$  regions.  $Y$  are the three dependent variables, measured at the individual level.  $\alpha$  represents the constant,  $Z$  is a vector of region-level variables,  $\delta$  is a vector of coefficients for the region-level variables,  $X$  is a vector of individual-level variables,  $\beta$  is a vector of coefficients for eight individual-level variables,  $\mu_j$  are the region-level random effects, and  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  are the person–region error terms. In plain English, the random effects allow the linear regression line to shift up and down for each region, producing a region-specific intercept. This means that the strength of the overall relationship between the number of years under Habsburg rule, for example, and levels of conservatism, altruism, or trust is assumed to be constant across regions (the slope of the regression line). At the same time, the baseline level of how conservative, self-transcendent, or trusting the population of a region is, independent of the Habsburg experience, differs across regions (the intercept where the regression line meets the  $x$  axis). Likelihood-ratio tests show that this multilevel specification is preferable over a simple model without random effects.

All statistical models include individual-level controls (not shown) for gender, age, whether the mother was born in the country of residence, whether the father was born in the country of residence, how much interest an individual shows for politics, how religious she reports to be, what (if any) religious faith she adheres to, and how many years of education she completed. These factors are commonly associated with values (see Wimmer and Soehl 2014) as well as with levels of trust.

At the regional level, I control for geography and past population movements to account for the possible endogeneity of how states expanded over the European territory in the past. The Roman Empire, for example, might have preferred to conquer regions along major rivers and lakes, or it may have avoided areas unsuitable for agriculture, too cold to be comfortable for its soldiers, or with too few people to be interesting as an imperial dependency. Contemporary attitudes might be shaped by these underlying conditions directly (a possibility discussed extensively in economics; see Voth [2021:257–61]) as well or indirectly through the history of state formations they produced, in line with the factor endowment school of historical legacies referenced above. To account for these possibilities, I experimented with a large number of geographic, climatic, and agricultural control variables at the regional level, using data from Schulz et al. (2019). I retained those that were significantly associated with the outcomes in baseline models: proximity to lakes or rivers, average elevation or ruggedness of terrain, latitude, and the distance to the next coast.

Another confounding factor is the history of population movements over the past 500 years (Voth 2021) above. Where history is marked by population exchanges



or refugee flows, individuals might trust each other less, be less altruistic, and hold on to more conservative values. Furthermore, such population movements make the estimation of legacy effects more imprecise because the legacy of a particular state might have moved together with the population to another region never under the rule of this particular historical state (see again O'Connell et al. 2020). To at least partially deal with these issues, I add a control variable that counts the share of contemporary population whose ancestors lived in another country in 1500 (the data come from Putterman and Weil [2010]; they were unfortunately coded at the country level).

The political history variables are entered as continuous numbers counting the number of years that a region was ruled by state A, state B, et cetera. Membership in contemporary states is coded in the same way. All results are represented in beta coefficients to ease interpretation: the coefficients express how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes with a full standard deviation change in the independent variable.

### *Legacies of the Church, Legacies of War*

Before presenting the political history models, I evaluate if religion or war, rather than the political history of states, influences contemporary attitudes. To return to the geological metaphor, we ask if it is volcanic or alluvial sedimentation that shapes the surface topography in more consequential ways. Let us start with religion. As briefly mentioned above, Schulz and coauthors (2019) argue that contemporary normative attitudes were profoundly affected by the medieval Church policy that preceded the rise of modern states. In the early Middle Ages, most Europeans lived in kinship-based societies, as did much of the rest of humanity, characterized by strong loyalties to family, clan, and traditional authorities. The Catholic Church began to break up these loyalties in order to extend its power over the population. The main tools were to prohibit cousin marriage and to prescribe that marriages and births be registered (and thus overseen) by the local church. Over time, this generated more altruistically motivated individuals who included strangers into the realm of solidarity, as preached by the gospel, and thus individuals who were more trusting of people with whom they had no kinship ties. Where the reach of the Western Church was more limited (as in Ottoman dominions or in Orthodox lands such as Ukraine), older attitudes survived to this day, so the argument goes.

I use the data of Schulz and coauthors (2019) to evaluate their intriguing argument empirically. Table 3 presents the results of a series of hierarchical linear models. They also include, at the regional level, the most important states that might have shaped attitudes before the onset of the Western Church's family policies: the Roman Empire, the Caliphate of Córdoba in Spain and Portugal, and the early medieval Carolingian Empire in central Europe.<sup>7</sup> The results are quite clear. Depending on the measurement for the relative influence of the medieval Church policies, there is a weak association with two or even with all three outcomes. In line with the theory, exposure to the Church policies left a legacy of less conservatism and more generalized trust as well as altruism/universalism. In the models going forward, which will focus on state legacies, I will use the most precise measurement

**Table 3:** Legacies of the medieval Western Church (hierarchical linear models with region random effects)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.
Ever part of the Roman Empire	-0.035 (0.119)	0.056* (0.032)	0.107* (0.033)	-0.041† (0.119)	0.057* (0.032)	0.100* (0.034)	-0.036 (0.118)	0.051* (0.032)	0.102* (0.033)	-0.025 (0.118)	0.051* (0.032)	0.109* (0.033)
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire	0.049* (0.111)	-0.098* (0.030)	-0.029 (0.031)	0.028 (0.123)	-0.092* (0.034)	-0.051* (0.034)	0.034† (0.118)	-0.109* (0.033)	-0.054* (0.033)	0.062* (0.100)	-0.121* (0.027)	-0.023 (0.028)
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba	0.100* (0.206)	-0.068* (0.056)	0.001 (0.057)	0.093* (0.206)	-0.065* (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)	0.093* (0.207)	-0.069* (0.057)	-0.008 (0.057)	0.105* (0.205)	-0.071* (0.056)	0.001 (0.057)
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 50 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)	0.035* (0.016)	-0.035* (0.004)	0.01 (0.004)									
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 100 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)				0.060* (0.014)	-0.037† (0.004)	0.039† (0.004)						
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 200 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)							0.051* (0.013)	-0.012 (0.003)	0.044* (0.003)			
Average number of bishoprics from 550 to 1500 (per 50-year period)										0.019 (163.500)	0.009 (44.840)	-0.003 (45.470)
Individual-level controls for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-level controls for geography and historical population movements	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	154,188	154,509	154,509	154,188	154,509	154,509	154,188	154,509	154,509	154,188	154,509	154,509

Notes: Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; constants omitted; †  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

with a 50-kilometer radius as a control variable. Also in line with expectations, individuals who live in a region that contained monasteries in the Middle Ages tend to be more trusting today and more altruistic/universalist, whereas there is no significant association with conservatism (Table 4). In the analysis that follows, I will integrate a control variable that measures proximity to any kind of monastery associated with the Western Church before 1500. Further below, I will return to the role of medieval Church policies by comparatively assessing how much variance between Europe's regions can be explained by these two variables and compare it with the explanatory power of the history of states.

Note that the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are net of controls, at the individual level, for religious faith, distinguishing between Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, adherents of other faiths, and a very large number of (possibly secular) individuals especially in the formerly Communist countries who preferred not to name a religious faith when filling out the survey. Including contemporary religion at the individual level is important because otherwise we would not be able to differentiate the effects of medieval Church policies from later processes that developed independently, such as the Protestant reformation (with substantial consequences for many values and attitudes) or the spread of Islam after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 (again with consequences for many contemporary attitudes; see, e.g., Soehl [2017] or Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel [2009]). Note that these individual-level variables do not capture historical legacy effects but rather the cumulative and continuous consequence of religious cultures in both the past and the present.<sup>8</sup>

Next, I evaluate if collective violence leaves an imprint on today's normative dispositions, arguably reducing trust in others (Price and Yaylacı 2021:286–88) and altruism. Table 5 shows the results, again integrating the three oldest states that ruled over Europe before the Middle Ages and thus before the war count starts. Clearly, there is no association between battle frequency and contemporary attitudes. The same holds true if we use a battle count measure that is weighed by how recently these battles were fought (results not shown). This does not rule out other, more specific legacies of violence or that the history of war could affect other outcomes (such as the propensity for interpersonal violence; see Miguel et al. 2008) or through other channels, such as personal battle experience, rather than geographic proximity to battle fields, or through collective memories and narratives. But the results of this section certainly do not stand in the way of looking at political history as a major source of enduring legacies.

### *Legacies of Political History*

To empirically identify the possible legacies of a series of states that ruled over different parts of Europe since 1500, I will use two approaches. Both proceed through a number of nested models, each adding a historical stratum to the previous one. In what I call the "forward-looking" models, we first explore whether the states that form the oldest stratum are associated with contemporary survey results (the topography of the landscape) if we disregard all subsequent history and thus do not take into account that successor states, including contemporary states, could

**Table 4:** Legacies of medieval monasteries (hierarchical linear models with region random effects)

	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ever part of the Roman Empire	−0.032 (0.117)	0.049* (0.032)	0.103* (0.033)	−0.024 (0.115)	0.048* (0.032)	0.109* (0.033)
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire	0.043* (0.109)	−0.112* (0.029)	−0.049* (0.030)	0.029 (0.107)	−0.114* (0.030)	−0.055* (0.030)
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba	0.109* (0.204)	−0.073* (0.056)	0.003 (0.057)	0.098* (0.201)	−0.072* (0.056)	−0.005 (0.057)
Ever exposed to Premonstratensian monasteries before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)	0.054* (0.110)	−0.013 (0.028)	0.054* (0.031)			
Ever exposed to Franciscan monasteries before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)				0.079* (0.094)	−0.008 (0.026)	0.061* (0.027)
Individual-level controls for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-level controls for geography and historical population movements	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	154,131	154,452	154,452	154,131	154,452	154,452
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Ever part of the Roman Empire	−0.022 (0.116)	0.048† (0.032)	0.111* (0.033)	−0.033 (0.117)	0.049* (0.032)	0.103* (0.033)
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire	0.034† (0.106)	−0.114* (0.029)	−0.046* (0.030)	0.034† (0.114)	−0.114* (0.030)	−0.055* (0.031)
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba	0.102* (0.201)	−0.072* (0.056)	−0.002 (0.057)	0.108* (0.203)	−0.072* (0.056)	0.001 (0.056)
Ever exposed to Dominican monasteries before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)	0.068* (0.095)	−0.007 (0.025)	0.044* (0.027)			
Ever exposed to Cistercian monasteries before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)				0.061* (0.108)	−0.007 (0.027)	0.057* (0.029)
Individual-level controls for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-level controls for geography and historical population movements	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	154,131	154,452	154,452	154,131	154,452	154,452
				(13)	(14)	(15)
Ever part of the Roman Empire				−0.029 (0.115)	0.048* (0.032)	0.106* (0.033)
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire				0.021 (0.112)	−0.112* (0.030)	−0.062* (0.031)
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba				0.104* (0.201)	−0.072* (0.056)	−0.002 (0.056)
Exposure to any monastery before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)				0.081* (0.029)	−0.011 (0.008)	0.066* (0.008)
Individual-level controls for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith				Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-level controls for geography and historical population movements				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations				154,131	154,452	154,452

Notes: Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; constants omitted; †  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 5:** Legacies of war (hierarchical linear models with region random effects)?

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Trust	Conserv.	Altruism /univ.
Ever part of the Roman empire	-0.028 (0.119)	0.051* (0.032)	0.107* (0.033)
Ever part of the Carolingian empire	0.068* (0.100)	-0.114* (0.027)	-0.026 (0.027)
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba	0.103* (0.211)	-0.068** (0.057)	-0.002 (0.058)
Number of battles fought in region since 1500	0.006 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.002)	0.013 (0.002)
Individual-level controls for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region-level controls for geography and historical population movements	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	154,188	154,509	154,509

Notes: Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; constants omitted; †  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

also have shaped today's attitudes. The oldest states are those who had five or more subsequent successor states (layer E or older). In the second model, we add a more recent layer of history by considering, in addition to the E+ layer, those states with four successor states (the states of stratum D). The third model adds all states with three successor states (stratum C), and the fourth model all states with two successors (the B stratum). The final model includes all states that ever governed over a region, including the stratum of contemporary states (the stratum A states).

The second perspective looks at history from the present toward increasingly remote pasts (the backward-looking perspective). The first model only comprises contemporary states, disregarding all previous history. The second models take the predecessor states B into account as well, counting the number of years spent in the various states of layer B. The third model includes contemporary states A, states B, and the states in layer C that preceded B. The fourth model includes all strata.

There are limitations to this modeling strategy. With only 411 regions, we may run into power and multicollinearity problems<sup>9</sup> when trying to estimate a model with all 80 states that ever existed in Europe since 1500 in addition to the regional control variables. I therefore drop insignificant state variables from subsequent models in order not to overburden them, except where a variable will become significant again in later models or where it refers to a different set of territories from one model to the next because a historical state may have been a layer B state for some regions and a layer C state for others.

There is also the possibility of what statisticians call "posttreatment bias," that is, of controlling away the effects of a "treatment" by including its consequences (see Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016; Blackwell and Glynn 2018). For example, the Roman Empire could have influenced how its successor states governed, shaping prevalent understandings of public duty in the tradition of Roman law. By adding the possible effects of these successor states, we could "control away" the legacy of

the Roman Empire conserved in these later states. According to Acharya and coauthors, we don't know whether including successor states under- or overestimates the effects of predecessors.<sup>10</sup> I hope that future research will find a meaningful technical solution to this problem (see Robins, Hernán, and Brumback [2000]; the approach of Imai, Kim, and Wang [2021] unfortunately works for time series data only).

The two modeling approaches differ in how they are affected by the problem. In the forward-looking models, we attribute variation to older layers of states, thus ignoring at first the possible consequences of more recent states, thus running the risk of omitted variable bias. From model to model, we reduce this risk by introducing later layers of states, thus increasing, on the other hand, the risk of posttreatment bias. In the backward-looking models, we first avoid the risk of posttreatment bias by not including any pretreatment variables, but risk omitted variable bias by not controlling for any previous history. By gradually adding earlier layers to the equation, we then again trade one risk for the other, ending in a model with fewer omitted variable problems and more possible posttreatment bias. Obviously, we cannot determine which modeling approach is more accurate precisely because we don't know how large the posttreatment bias or the omitted variable biases are. To estimate how influential a state is overall (as done in the section "Which States Leave Legacies?"), I will therefore simply add the average size of significant coefficients from the two model sets.

Tables 6 and 7 display the results of this model building strategy: a total of 27 statistical models each with a different combination of layers. Some legacy effects, such as those left by the Ottoman or Habsburg Empires, are already known from the literature, whereas others (of the pre-partition Kingdom of Poland or Denmark) come as a surprise. The information contained in these two tables is obviously too complex for a line-by-line interpretation. Instead, I will offer a series of meta-analyses that seek to make sense of the results.

### *Analysis of Variance*

Based on the models displayed in Tables 3 to 7, I start by analyzing the proportion of overall variance that is explained by the different layers of political history, by the medieval policies of the Church, and by the demographic, climatic, and geographic controls variables, using the formula specified by Steenbergen (2012).

Panel 1 in Table 8 suggests that overall, the political history of Europe explains a large proportion of variance at the regional level. Excluding contemporary, continuing states and focusing exclusively on extinct polities, approximately 50 to 70 percent of variance at the regional level is explained by the political history of predecessor states, depending on the outcome we focus upon. The control variables measuring the geographic, climatic, and demographic characteristics of regions explain approximately 20 to 50 percent of variance. By contrast, the two variables related to the medieval policies of the Church together account for only about 1.5 to 3 percent of variance.

The next two panels no longer compare across types of legacies (whether volcanic strata or alluvial sediments shape the topography, to return to the metaphor)



**Table 6:** Forward-looking perspective (hierarchical linear models with region random effects): F and E strata (antiquity and early middle ages) and D stratum; C and B strata added

	F + E strata			D stratum added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Ever part of the Roman Empire	0.025	0.04	0.116*	0.011	0.050 <sup>†</sup>	0.092*
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire	-0.004	-0.105*	-0.033	-0.021	-0.092*	-0.087*
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba	0.036 <sup>†</sup>	-0.061*	-0.007	0.035 <sup>†</sup>	-0.080*	-0.02
Part of the Byzantine Empire around 1050	-0.117*	0.02	-0.015	-0.118*	0.003	-0.011
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 50 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)				-0.017	-0.038*	-0.036 <sup>†</sup>
Exposure to any monastery before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)				0.023	0.015	0.105*
Ever contained an independent city-state				0.029 <sup>†</sup>	-0.018	0.047*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Bohemia				-0.009	-0.015	-0.069*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Poland (pre-partition)				-0.034*	0.008	-0.001
Years ruled by Livonian Confederation				-0.019	0.130*	0.087*
Years ruled by State of the Teutonic Order				-0.012	-0.005	-0.023
Years ruled by Duchy of Pomerania				-0.007	-0.004	-0.01
Years ruled by Astrakhan Khanate				0.002	0.007	0.003
Observations	154,188	154,509	154,509	154,131	154,452	154,452

	C stratum added			B stratum added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Ever part of the Roman Empire	0.001	0.066*	0.054*	-0.032	0.059*	0.02
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire	0.001	-0.105*	-0.078*	-0.021	-0.095*	-0.077*
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba	0.070*	-0.008	0.045 <sup>†</sup>	0.039 <sup>†</sup>	0.01	0.026
Part of the Byzantine Empire around 1050	-0.110*	-0.001	-0.028 <sup>†</sup>	-0.070*	-0.02	0.018
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 50 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)	-0.027	-0.057*	-0.034	-0.052*	-0.035 <sup>†</sup>	-0.03
Exposure to any monastery before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)	0.037 <sup>†</sup>	-0.001	0.045 <sup>†</sup>	0.025	-0.001	0.044
Ever contained an independent city-state	0.022	-0.001	0.039*	0.044*	0.017	0.042*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Bohemia	0.034 <sup>†</sup>	-0.029	-0.053*	0.030 <sup>†</sup>	-0.03	-0.02
Years ruled by Kingdom of Poland (pre-partition)	-0.024*	0.003	-0.001	-0.037*	0.006	0.005
Years ruled by Republic of Estonia (pre-USSR)	0.101	-0.011	0.026	0.001	0.049	0.147 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Lithuania	-0.017	0.013	-0.064 <sup>†</sup>	-0.042	0.013	-0.126*
Years ruled by Irish Earldoms and Lordships	-0.037*	0.053*	0.006	-0.076*	0.016	-0.016
Years ruled by Republic of Latvia (pre-USSR)	-0.023	0.043*	0.013	-0.053*	0.078*	0.056*
Years ruled by Republic of Lithuania (pre-USSR)	0.007	-0.051	-0.107*	0.01	-0.029	-0.037
Years ruled by Kingdom of Portugal (before Spanish interlude)	-0.086*	-0.197*	-0.214*	-0.067*	-0.185*	-0.206*
Years ruled by Safavid Empire	-0.053*	0.043*	-0.001	-0.047*	0.037*	0.007
Years ruled by Khanate of Siber	-0.029*	0.018	-0.006	-0.029*	0.014	-0.007
Years ruled by Habsburg Empire (various strata)	-0.052*	0.036*	-0.023	-0.037*	0.033 <sup>†</sup>	-0.040*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (various strata)	0.043 <sup>†</sup>	0.038	-0.033	0.006	-0.047 <sup>†</sup>	0.015
Years ruled by small German states before unification (various strata)	-0.032 <sup>†</sup>	0.028	0.015	-0.066*	0.008	-0.017
Years ruled by Brandenburg-Prussia/Kingdom of Prussia (various strata)	-0.015*	0.007	0.006	-0.041*	0.021	0.01
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Moscow/Tsardom of Russia/Romanov Russia (various strata)	0.011	-0.016	-0.036*	-0.058*	0.020*	-0.037*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (various strata)	-0.006	0.022	-0.001	-0.055*	-0.01	-0.013
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sweden (various strata)	-0.067	0.062	-0.084	-0.009	0.081 <sup>†</sup>	-0.137*
Years ruled by Ottoman Empire (various strata)	0.013	-0.008	-0.025 <sup>†</sup>	-0.090*	0.057*	-0.067*
Years ruled by Northern Italian city-states and duchies	0.002	0.021*	0.01	-0.002	0.014	0.002
Years ruled by State of the Church (Papal States)	0.009 <sup>†</sup>	0.013*	0.001	-0.009	0.001	0.001
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sardinia (before Napoleon)	0.004	0	-0.021*	-0.002	-0.003	-0.013
Years ruled by Burgundian Netherlands (strata C+)	-0.017	0.016	0.011			
Years ruled by Kingdom of Hungary	0.012	0.003	-0.001			
Years ruled by Khanate of Kazan	0.007	0.017	0.022			
Years ruled by Nogai Horde	0	-0.001	-0.015			

Table 6 continued: Forward-looking perspective, C and B strata continued; A stratum added

	C stratum added			B stratum added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Years ruled by Kingdom of Naples	0.017	-0.003	0.002			
Years ruled by Republic of Czechoslovakia				-0.069*	0.022	-0.077*
Years ruled by Mamluk Egypt				-0.022*	-0.019 <sup>†</sup>	-0.019 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sardinia (after Napoleon)				0.01	0.014	-0.001
Years ruled by Kingdom of the Two Sicilies				0.047*	0.031	-0.002
Years ruled by Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg				0.002	-0.013	-0.023*
Years ruled by Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman				-0.018*	0.015 <sup>†</sup>	0.017 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia/Yugoslavia				-0.019 <sup>†</sup>	0.041*	0.043*
Years ruled by German Empire/Weimar Republic/Federal Republic of Germany (stratum B)				-0.012	0.002	-0.004
Years ruled by USSR (stratum B)				-0.017	-0.021	-0.032
Years ruled by Kingdom of Bavaria				0.021	-0.023	0
Years ruled by Kingdom of Scotland				-0.013	0.017	0.002
Years ruled by Prince-Bishopric of Liège				0.012	0.024	0.026
Years ruled by Duchy of Lorraine				-0.01	-0.007	-0.004
Years ruled by Kingdom of Navarre				0.001	-0.003	-0.001
Years ruled by Duchy of Savoy				-0.005	-0.022	-0.026
Years ruled by England/United Kingdom (stratum B)				0.028	0.038	0.016
Years ruled by Kingdom of Württemberg				-0.002	-0.025	-0.007
Observations	154,131	154,452	154,452	154,131	154,452	154,452
				A stratum added		
				Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Ever part of the Roman Empire				-0.003	-0.024	-0.015
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire				-0.02	-0.044	-0.035
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba				0.005	0.007	-0.01
Part of the Byzantine Empire around 1050				-0.069*	-0.033	-0.003
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 50 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)				0.001	-0.011	-0.01
Ever contained an independent city-state				0.031 <sup>†</sup>	-0.039 <sup>†</sup>	0.003
Years ruled by Kingdom of Bohemia				-0.012	0.017	0.058 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Poland (pre-partition)				-0.025*	0.005	0.011
Years ruled by Republic of Estonia (pre-USSR)				0.157	-0.024	-0.022
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Lithuania				-0.011	0.048	0.016
Years ruled by Irish Earldoms and Lordships				-0.192	-0.275 <sup>†</sup>	-0.321*
Years ruled by Republic of Latvia (pre-USSR)				0.003	0.052	0.002
Years ruled by Republic of Lithuania (pre-USSR)				0.052	-0.128*	-0.200*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Portugal (before Spanish interlude)				-0.039	-0.228*	-0.181*
Years ruled by Safavid Empire				-0.012	0.007	0.005
Years ruled by Khanate of Siber				-0.012	-0.003	-0.009
Years ruled by Habsburg Empire (various strata)				-0.03	0.02	-0.069 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (various strata)				0.039 <sup>†</sup>	-0.032	0.005
Years ruled by small German states before unification (various strata)				-0.014	0.004	-0.013
Years ruled by Brandenburg-Prussia/Kingdom of Prussia (various strata)				-0.013	-0.008	-0.01
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Moscow/Tsardom of Russia/Romanov Russia (various strata)				-0.045*	0.014	-0.028*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (various strata)				-0.024*	-0.001	0.004
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sweden (various strata)				-0.036	0.072	0.001
Years ruled by Ottoman Empire (various strata)				0.01	0.019	0.01
Years ruled by Republic of Czechoslovakia				-0.037	0.148	0.222
Years ruled by Mamluk Egypt				-0.016*	-0.013	-0.016 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sardinia (after Napoleon)				0.010 <sup>†</sup>	-0.007	-0.017*
Years ruled by Kingdom of the Two Sicilies				0.027*	0.011	-0.007
Years ruled by Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg				-0.001	-0.021*	-0.032*
Years ruled by Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman				-0.007	0.016*	0.022*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia/Yugoslavia				-0.003	-0.004	0.049*
Years ruled by Albania				-0.029*	0.002	-0.007
Years ruled by Republic of Austria				0.042*	-0.011	0.039*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Belgium				0.013	-0.026	0.017
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Bulgaria				-0.037 <sup>†</sup>	0.028	-0.032

Table 6 continued: Forward-looking perspective, A stratum continued

	A stratum added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Years ruled by Republic of Croatia	0.021	0.015	-0.027
Years ruled by Cyprus	0.011	0.026	0.008
Years ruled by Czech Republic	0.048	-0.2	-0.312*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (stratum A)	0.062*	-0.061*	-0.011
Years ruled by Republic of Estonia (post-USSR)	0	0	0
Years ruled by Finland	0.055*	-0.014	0.019
Years ruled by Kingdom of France/French Republic	0.002	-0.081*	-0.023
Years ruled by German Empire/Weimar Republic/Federal Republic of Germany (stratum A)	-0.019	-0.037	0.018
Years ruled by Greece	-0.001	0.007	0.003
Years ruled by Hungary	0.002	0.004	0.026
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Iceland	0.003	-0.056*	-0.003
Years ruled by Ireland	0.192	0.248	0.314†
Years ruled by Republic of Kosovo	-0.014	0.066†	0.01
Years ruled by Republic of Latvia (post-USSR)	0	0	0
Years ruled by Republic of Lithuania (post-USSR)	0	0	0
Years ruled by Kingdom of Norway	0.121*	-0.147*	-0.092
Years ruled by United Provinces/Kingdom of the Netherlands	0.085*	-0.103*	-0.040†
Years ruled by Republic of Poland	-0.007	-0.029†	-0.034*
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Portugal (after Spanish interlude)	0	0	0
Years ruled by Kingdom of Romania/Romania	-0.046*	-0.050*	-0.078*
Years ruled by USSR/Russian Federation (stratum A)	-0.03	0.008	-0.021
Years ruled by Slovak Republic	-0.01	-0.074	-0.146
Years ruled by Republic of Slovenia	0	0	0
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (stratum A)	0.034†	-0.023	0.04
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sweden (stratum A)	0.073*	-0.122*	-0.018
Years ruled by Swiss Confederation	0.065*	0.007	0.035
Years ruled by Turkey	-0.044†	0.004	-0.017
Years ruled by England/United Kingdom (stratum A)	0.024	-0.034	-0.008
Years ruled by Ukraine	0.008	-0.042	-0.090*
Observations	154,131	154,452	154,452

Notes: All models control on the individual level for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith; on the region level for geography, climate, agricultural suitability, and historical population movements. Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors and constants omitted; †  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

but between different layers of political history, similar to comparing across types of alluvial strata: those left by mud–sand–gravel compounds or those composed of the skeletons of tiny animals. The basic message is that long-gone states are clearly important in understanding contemporary attitudes—a point to which we will return in the section “Which States Leave Legacies?” below. How important they are, however, depends on the perspective assumed: if we enter the oldest strata first into the equation (the forward-looking perspective; see panel 2 in Table 8), there is much more variance left to explain compared with entering the variables associated with these oldest strata last, as we do when assuming the backward-looking perspective in panel 3. In the forward-looking models, the premodern states of the Roman Empire, the Caliphate of Córdoba, the Carolingian Empire, and Byzantium explain between 3.5 and 14 percent of variance, depending on the outcome.<sup>11</sup> This compares with the 10 to 16 percent of additional variance explained by all the contemporary states of stratum A. With regard to two of the three outcomes, stratum G/F or stratum C explains more variance than the contemporary stratum A.

**Table 7:** Backward-looking models (hierarchical linear models with region random effects): A and B strata

	A stratum			B stratum added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Years ruled by Albania	-0.052*	0.016 <sup>†</sup>	-0.005	-0.057*	-0.002	-0.023 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Republic of Austria	0.01	0.008	-0.015	0.015	-0.009	-0.022
Years ruled by Kingdom of Belgium	-0.024	-0.017	-0.02	-0.017	-0.037 <sup>†</sup>	-0.025
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Bulgaria	-0.090*	0.058*	-0.031*	-0.104*	0.018	-0.071*
Years ruled by Republic of Croatia	0.013	0.062 <sup>†</sup>	0.022	-0.04	0.033	0.002
Years ruled by Cyprus	0.015	0.072*	0.039	-0.021	0.048	0.024
Years ruled by Czech Republic	-0.041*	0.003	-0.125*	-0.036	-0.107	-0.203
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (stratum A)	0.051*	-0.044*	-0.024 <sup>†</sup>	0.060*	-0.052*	-0.023
Years ruled by Republic of Estonia (post-USSR)	0.103	0.183	0.077	0.059	0.069	0.144
Years ruled by Finland	0.029	-0.013	-0.019	0.043 <sup>†</sup>	-0.001	-0.017
Years ruled by Republic of France	-0.018	-0.047 <sup>†</sup>	-0.022	-0.048	-0.083*	-0.039
Years ruled by German Empire/Weimar Republic/ Federal Republic of Germany (stratum A)	-0.050*	-0.025	-0.024	-0.047 <sup>†</sup>	-0.070*	-0.031
Years ruled by Greece	-0.044*	0.027	-0.003	-0.03	0.001	-0.022
Years ruled by Hungary	-0.027 <sup>†</sup>	0.061*	0	-0.03	0.051 <sup>†</sup>	0.035
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Iceland	0.005	-0.057*	-0.018	0.005	-0.055*	-0.019
Years ruled by Ireland	-0.021	0.005	-0.027	-0.007	0.003	-0.001
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Italy	-0.002	0.027*	-0.024*	-0.018	0.040*	-0.002
Years ruled by Republic of Kosovo	-0.011	0.111*	0.076*	-0.070*	0.080*	0.042
Years ruled by Republic of Latvia (post-USSR)	-0.006	0.137*	0.066	-0.053	0.084	0.085
Years ruled by Republic of Lithuania (post-USSR)	0.026	-0.012	-0.153*	0.066	-0.079	-0.097
Years ruled by Kingdom of Norway	0.100*	-0.101*	-0.129*	0.140*	-0.121*	-0.132*
Years ruled by Kingdom of the Netherlands	0.048*	-0.083*	-0.078*	0.064*	-0.110*	-0.081*
Years ruled by Republic of Poland	-0.048*	0.004	-0.038*	-0.035*	-0.001	-0.035*
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Portugal (after Spanish interlude)	-0.069*	-0.157*	-0.199*	-0.012	-0.191*	-0.209*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Romania/Romania	-0.057*	-0.021 <sup>†</sup>	-0.087*	-0.053*	-0.040*	-0.097*
Years ruled by USSR/Russian Federation (stratum A)	-0.108*	0.050*	-0.076*	-0.159*	0.062*	-0.101*
Years ruled by Slovak Republic	-0.056*	0.065*	-0.038 <sup>†</sup>	-0.086	-0.018	-0.099
Years ruled by Republic of Slovenia	-0.022*	0.018*	-0.002	-0.022*	0.003	-0.011
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (stratum A)	0.019	0.021	0.027	0.043*	-0.01	0.012
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sweden (stratum A)	0.062*	-0.088*	-0.027	0.046*	-0.107*	-0.035
Years ruled by Swiss Confederation	0.067*	0.024	0.053 <sup>†</sup>	0.026	-0.016	0.019
Years ruled by Turkey	-0.084*	0.041*	0.012	-0.093*	0.011	-0.013
Years ruled by England/United Kingdom (stratum A)	0.004	0.005	-0.021	0.004	-0.024	-0.028
Years ruled by Ukraine	-0.031	0.046 <sup>†</sup>	-0.070*	-0.071*	0.006	-0.092*
Years ruled by Habsburg Empire (various strata)				-0.005	-0.027	-0.052*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (various strata)				0.02	-0.012	0.002
Years ruled by Mamluk Egypt				-0.016*	-0.013	-0.015 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Duchy of Lorraine				-0.012	-0.005	-0.002
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Moscow/Tsardom of Russia/Romanov Russia (various strata)				0.076*	-0.048 <sup>†</sup>	0.018
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sardinia (after Napoleon)				0.017*	-0.019 <sup>†</sup>	-0.017 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of the Two Sicilies				0.018 <sup>†</sup>	-0.018	-0.014
Years ruled by Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg				0.002	-0.023*	-0.027*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (various strata)				-0.030 <sup>†</sup>	-0.014	-0.007
Years ruled by Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman				-0.009	0.014 <sup>†</sup>	0.020*
Years ruled by USSR (stratum B)				-0.188*	0.046	-0.147*
Years ruled by Duchy of Savoy				-0.005	-0.026 <sup>†</sup>	-0.032*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Bavaria				0.013	-0.007	-0.01
Years ruled by Burgundian Netherlands (stratum B)				-0.002	0	0.001
Years ruled by Republic of Czechoslovakia				0.015	0.087	0.075
Years ruled by small German states before unification (stratum B)				0.001	0.005	-0.006
Years ruled by Brandenburg-Prussia/Kingdom of Prussia (stratum B)				-0.012	0.023	0.006
Years ruled by German Empire/Weimar Republic/Federal Republic of Germany (stratum B)				-0.002	-0.012	-0.008
Years ruled by Kingdom of Scotland				0.005	-0.003	-0.005
Years ruled by Prince-Bishopric of Liège				-0.008	-0.004	0.002
Years ruled by Kingdom of Navarre				-0.001	-0.005	-0.002
Years ruled by Safavid Empire				-0.007	0.01	0.013
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sweden (stratum B)				0	0	0

Table 7 continued: Backward-looking models, A and B strata continued; C and D strata added

	A stratum			B stratum added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Years ruled by Ottoman Empire (stratum B)				0.035	0.016	0.037
Years ruled by England/United Kingdom (stratum B)				0.007	-0.022	-0.032
Years ruled by Kingdom of Württemberg				0.014	-0.013	-0.009
Years ruled by Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia/Yugoslavia				0	0	0
Observations	154,188	154,509	154,509	154,188	154,509	154,509
	C stratum added			D+ strata added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Years ruled by Albania	-0.049*	0.012	-0.003	-0.030*	0.012	-0.003
Years ruled by Republic of Austria	0.038*	0.02	0.017	0.038*	0.026	0.042 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Belgium	-0.002	-0.018	0	0.012	0.007	0.028
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Bulgaria	-0.083*	0.051*	-0.022	-0.041*	0.046*	-0.023
Years ruled by Republic of Croatia	-0.031	0.06	0.027	0	0.015	0.008
Years ruled by Cyprus	-0.022	0.066*	0.03	0.001	0.033	0.018
Years ruled by Czech Republic	0.009	0.009	-0.081*	0.025	-0.029	-0.103*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (stratum A)	0.064*	-0.044*	-0.011	0.067*	-0.051*	-0.009
Years ruled by Republic of Estonia (post-USSR)	0.002	0.148	0.117	0.063	-0.005	-0.007
Years ruled by Finland	0.075*	-0.01	0.008	0.063*	-0.005	0.016
Years ruled by Republic of France	-0.048 <sup>†</sup>	-0.056 <sup>†</sup>	-0.019	-0.016	-0.058*	-0.009
Years ruled by German Empire/Weimar Republic/ Federal Republic of Germany (stratum A)	-0.040*	-0.029	-0.002	-0.041*	-0.016	0.009
Years ruled by Greece	-0.023	0.023	0.006	0.001	0.028	0.01
Years ruled by Hungary	-0.031	0.060*	0.042	-0.005	0.032	0.032
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Iceland	0.012	-0.049*	-0.008	0.009	-0.052*	-0.005
Years ruled by Ireland	0.197	0.274 <sup>†</sup>	0.316*	0.204	0.287 <sup>†</sup>	0.331*
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Italy	0	0.051*	-0.008	-0.01	0.060*	0.014
Years ruled by Republic of Kosovo	-0.060*	0.104*	0.064 <sup>†</sup>	-0.032	0.062 <sup>†</sup>	0.045
Years ruled by Republic of Latvia (post-USSR)	-0.073	0.118	0.072	-0.037	0.041	0.012
Years ruled by Republic of Lithuania (post-USSR)	0.036	-0.05	-0.120 <sup>†</sup>	0.02	-0.092 <sup>†</sup>	-0.179*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Norway	0.126*	-0.083 <sup>†</sup>	-0.105*	0.118*	-0.093 <sup>†</sup>	-0.096 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of the Netherlands	0.066*	-0.088*	-0.056*	0.085*	-0.066*	-0.03
Years ruled by Republic of Poland	-0.023 <sup>†</sup>	0.001	-0.021	-0.007	-0.007	-0.025
Years ruled by Kingdom/Republic of Portugal (after Spanish interlude)	-0.026	-0.172*	-0.187*	-0.039	-0.190*	-0.175*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Romania/Romania	-0.045*	-0.024 <sup>†</sup>	-0.072*	-0.044*	-0.033*	-0.074*
Years ruled by USSR/Russian Federation (stratum A)	-0.065*	0.049	-0.021	-0.047*	0.022	-0.016
Years ruled by Slovak Republic	-0.069*	0.065*	-0.004	-0.041 <sup>†</sup>	0.028	-0.017
Years ruled by Republic of Slovenia	-0.003	0.022	0.014	-0.006	0.021	0.029 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (stratum A)	0.035 <sup>†</sup>	0.011	0.036	0.034	0.005	0.046 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sweden (stratum A)	0.056*	-0.084*	-0.01	0.073*	-0.117*	-0.017
Years ruled by Swiss Confederation	0.027	0.015	0.042	0.044	0.015	0.044
Years ruled by Turkey	-0.097*	0.031	0.001	-0.054*	0.011	-0.01
Years ruled by England/United Kingdom (stratum A)	0.009	0	-0.004	0.024	-0.016	-0.001
Years ruled by Ukraine	-0.048	0.032	-0.053	-0.015	-0.023	-0.076 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Habsburg Empire (various strata)	-0.052 <sup>†</sup>	-0.019	-0.038	-0.027	-0.008	-0.056
Years ruled by Kingdom of Denmark (various strata)	0.037 <sup>†</sup>	-0.019	0.012	0.039 <sup>†</sup>	-0.029	0.005
Years ruled by Mamluk Egypt	-0.016*	-0.013	-0.016 <sup>†</sup>	-0.016*	-0.013	-0.016 <sup>†</sup>
Years ruled by Duchy of Lorraine	-0.013 <sup>†</sup>	-0.003	0	-0.012 <sup>†</sup>	-0.001	0.001
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Moscow/Tsardom of Russia/Romanov Russia (various strata)	-0.032*	0.001	-0.029*	-0.040*	0.008	-0.031*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sardinia (after Napoleon)	0.020 <sup>†</sup>	0	-0.001	0.016	-0.005	-0.003
Years ruled by Kingdom of the Two Sicilies	0.039*	-0.034	-0.023	0.033*	-0.015	-0.012
Years ruled by Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg	-0.003	-0.025*	-0.030*	-0.002	-0.024*	-0.032*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Spain (various strata)	-0.041*	0.001	0.01	-0.027*	-0.002	0.005
Years ruled by Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman	-0.007	0.014 <sup>†</sup>	0.021*	-0.006	0.016*	0.023*
Years ruled by USSR (stratum B)	-0.076	0.023	-0.06			
Years ruled by Duchy of Savoy	-0.005	-0.012	-0.02			

Table 7 continued: Backward-looking models, C and D strata continued

	C stratum added			D+ strata added		
	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.	Trust	Conserv.	Altr./univ.
Years ruled by Irish Earldoms and Lordships	-0.194	-0.271 <sup>†</sup>	-0.322*	-0.196	-0.292*	-0.333*
Years ruled by Kingdom of Sardinia (before Napoleon)	-0.011	-0.025 <sup>†</sup>	-0.015	-0.003	-0.023*	-0.024*
Years ruled by Republic of Estonia (pre-USSR)	0	0	0			
Years ruled by Grand Duchy of Lithuania	-0.026	0.02	0			
Years ruled by Kingdom of Hungary	0.022	0.002	-0.02			
Years ruled by Khanate of Kazan	0.009	0.004	0.005			
Years ruled by Republic of Latvia (pre-USSR)	0	0	0			
Years ruled by Republic of Lithuania (pre-USSR)	0	0	0			
Years ruled by Northern Italian city-states and duchies	-0.012	-0.01	0.001			
Years ruled by Nogai Horde	0.01	-0.004	-0.009			
Years ruled by State of the Church (Papal States)	-0.008	0.006	0.007			
Years ruled by Kingdom of Portugal (before Spanish interlude)	0	0	0			
Years ruled by Khanate of Sibir	-0.006	-0.004	-0.009			
Years ruled by Kingdom of Naples	-0.011	0.018	0.016			
Years ruled by Astrakhan Khanate				0.012	-0.003	-0.008
Ever contained an independent city-state				0.038*	-0.018	0.013
Years ruled by Kingdom of Bohemia				-0.017	0.013	0.038
Years ruled by Livonian Confederation				0	0	0
Years ruled by Kingdom of Poland (pre-partition)				-0.025*	0.008	0.008
Years ruled by Duchy of Pomerania				0.001	-0.012*	-0.011*
Years ruled by State of the Teutonic Order				-0.005	-0.008	-0.007
Ever part of the Roman Empire				0.007	-0.019	-0.015
Ever part of the Carolingian Empire				-0.013	-0.073*	-0.046
Ever part of the Caliphate of Córdoba				0.002	0.012	-0.008
Part of the Byzantine Empire around 1050				-0.063 <sup>†</sup>	-0.019	-0.003
Cumulative exposure to Western bishopric (within 50 km every 50 years from 550 to 1500)				0.008	-0.02	-0.011
Exposure to any monastery before 1500 (in % territory within 50 km)				-0.021	-0.015	-0.014
Observations	154,188	154,509	154,509	154,131	154,452	154,452

Notes: All models control on the individual level for gender, age, education, nativity, political interest, employment history, religiosity, and religious faith; on the region level for geography, climate, agricultural suitability, and historical population movements. Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors and constants omitted; <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

If we assume the backward-looking perspective, the trend is dramatically reversed: the most recent stratum A shows by far the most explanatory power by accounting for 36 to 47 percent of regional variance, whereas the older strata contribute much less, with the oldest states (of the D+ strata) adding close to nothing to the variance explained. Still, the B stratum states explain an additional two to four percent of variance over the models with only A states. Given the uncertainty as to how much contemporary states simply carry the legacies of predecessor states forward (the posttreatment bias discussed above), we should not rely on the results of panel 3 exclusively but take those of panel 2 into account as well. Overall, these results support the idea that the study of legacies may profit from considering a series of strata together, as even older states that were succeeded by many more recent states may have left durable legacies. Having established the importance of multiple, subsequent legacies, the next section analyzes how these different strata may moderate each other's effects.



**Table 8:** Variance estimates for random effect parameters at the regional level: Trust

Panel 1: Types of legacies				Panel 2: Forward-looking models				Panel 3: Backward-looking models			
Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable	Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable	Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable
0.9566725	No regional control variables			0.9566725	No regional control variables			0.9566725	No regional control variables		
0.498906	Regional control variables added	47.85		0.3660549	Regional controls and G and F strata added (4 historical states: Roman Empire, Carolingian Empire, Caliphate of Córdoba, and Byzantine Empire)	61.74	13.89	0.1540226	Regional controls and A stratum added (33 contemporary states)	83.90	36.05
0.9411277	Church exposure and monasteries (no regional controls)	1.62	0.81	0.3416055	D stratum added (7 historical states plus monasteries and Church exposure)	64.29	2.56	0.1374778	B stratum added (26 historical states)	85.63	1.73
0.2947445	Political history (45 extinct states) (no regional controls)	69.19	1.54	0.2717401	C stratum added (24 states)	71.60	7.30	0.1312552	C stratum added (14 historical states)	86.28	0.65
				0.2295426	B stratum added (15 states)	76.01	4.41	0.1303417	D+ strata added (11 historical states plus monasteries and Church exposure)	86.38	0.10
				0.131149	A stratum added (34 contemporary states)	86.29	10.28				
					<i>Average additional variance explained by stratum of state</i>	7.69			<i>Average additional variance explained by stratum of state</i>	9.63	

Table 8 continued: Variance estimates for random effect parameters at the regional level: Conservatism

Panel 1: Types of legacies				Panel 2: Forward-looking models				Panel 3: Backward-looking models			
Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable	Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable	Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable
0.0594384	No regional control variables			0.0594384	No regional control variables			0.0594384	No regional control variables		
0.0388765	Regional control variables added	34.59		0.0334146	Regional controls and G and F strata added (4 historical states: Roman Empire, Carolingian Empire, Caliphate of Córdoba, and Byzantine Empire)	43.78	9.19	0.0153612	Regional controls and A stratum added (33 contemporary states)	74.16	39.56
0.0577089	Church exposure and monasteries (no regional controls)	2.91	1.45	0.0317154	D stratum added (7 historical states plus monasteries and Church exposure)	46.64	2.86	0.0137753	B stratum added (26 historical states)	76.82	2.67
0.0244469	Political history (45 extinct states) (no regional controls)	58.87	1.31	0.0250183	C stratum added (24 states)	57.91	11.27	0.0138219	C stratum added (14 historical states)	76.75	-0.08
				0.0219046	B stratum added (15 states)	63.15	5.24	0.0131535	D+ strata added (10 historical states plus monasteries and Church exposure)	77.87	1.12
				0.0138926	A stratum added (34 contemporary states)	76.63	13.48				
					<i>Average additional variance explained by stratum of state</i>	8.41			<i>Average additional variance explained by stratum of state</i>	10.82	

Table 8 continued: Variance estimates for random effect parameters at the regional level: Altruism/ universalism

Panel 1: Types of legacies				Panel 2: Forward-looking models				Panel 3: Backward-looking models			
Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable	Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable	Estimate for region random effect	Independent variables at the regional level	Total regional variance explained	Variance explained per variable
0.0459443	No regional control variables			0.0459443	No regional control variables			0.0459443	No regional control variables		
0.0366131	Regional control variables added	20.31		0.0350505	Regional controls and G and F strata added (4 historical states: Roman Empire, Carolingian Empire, Caliphate of Córdoba, and Byzantine Empire)	23.71	3.40	0.0147925	Regional controls and A stratum added (33 contemporary states)	67.80	47.49
0.045182	Church exposure and monasteries (no regional controls)	1.66	0.83	0.0317418	D stratum added (7 historical states plus monasteries and Church exposure)	30.91	7.20	0.0128747	B stratum added (26 historical states)	71.98	4.17
0.0224245	Political history (45 extinct states) (no regional controls)	51.19	1.14	0.0229061	C stratum added (24 states)	50.14	19.23	0.0127869	C stratum added (14 historical states)	72.17	0.19
				0.0204387	B stratum added (15 states)	55.51	5.37	0.0126194	D+ strata added (10 historical states plus monasteries and Church exposure)	72.53	0.36
				0.0128698	A stratum added (34 contemporary states)	71.99	16.47				
				<i>Average additional variance explained by stratum of state</i>		10.34		<i>Average additional variance explained by stratum of state</i>		13.06	

## Types of Layering

### Three Types


To arrive at a typology of how subsequent legacies modify those preceding them and the other way around, I return to geological imagery. We can find each type of moderation in how later legacies affect earlier ones (taking a forward-looking perspective) and in how earlier legacies shaped later ones (assuming a backward-looking perspective). We thus arrive at the following typology (Figure 1).

*Preserving/predetermining.* In the first type, earlier legacies trump later ones. Looking forward, the legacy of a historically far removed state (C in Figure 2) does not change when we add information about more recent legacies: the surface topography (the survey responses of today’s Europeans) remains structured by state C. Seen from the backward-looking perspective, the legacy of contemporary state A is less and less associated with survey results (the surface topography) the more we take older legacies into account (the deeper we drill down and add knowledge about the structure of previous strata). The legacies of contemporary state A are predetermined, in other words, by those of the previous strata. State A therefore leaves only a marginal imprint on contemporary attitudes once we take all previous strata into account.

*Neutralizing/independence.* The second type of relationship between layers represents the opposite of the first one: now, the older legacies (stratum C) are irrelevant for the shape of the surface topography, which is determined by the most recent stratum of history A (as illustrated by Figure 3). Seen from the forward-looking perspective, the older strata decrease in relevance for understanding the present as

	No effect	Decreases legacy	Increases legacy
Forward looking perspective: Earlier legacies modified by later ones	Preserving	Neutralizing	Amplifying
Backward looking perspective: Later legacies modified by earlier ones	Pre-determining	Independence	Pre-configuring


Figure 1: A typology of layering effects.




**Figure 2:** Preserving/predetermining. *Note:* In this configuration of layers, states A and B do not modify the surface topography, which is determined by the oldest state C.

soon as we know more about more recent legacies. In other words, the effects of the older strata, while still visible when disregarding all possible legacies of successor states, are neutralized by the later ones through the processes of disruption, dislocation, or gradual institutional change discussed in the theory section. Seen from a backward-looking perspective, it becomes more and more evident that contemporary attitudes shape today's attitudes the more layers of predecessor states we take into account. Contemporary states therefore influenced survey responses independently of the earlier legacies and therefore “undo” the latter's association with contemporary attitudes.

*Amplifying/preconfiguring.* In the final relationship between layers, historical and contemporary states reinforce each other's influence on contemporary attitudes, as illustrated in Figure 4. Seen from a forward-looking perspective, the relevance of older legacies increases the more we take recent legacies into account as well. This is due to cumulative causation: the characteristics of state C that left some legacy effect was reinforced by states B and A, thus amplifying the original association with contemporary attitudes. The influence of a historical state is therefore accentuated if the effects of contemporary states are taken into account as well. Seen from the backward-looking perspective, cumulative causation means that the effects of contemporary states become less important if we take the legacies of predecessor states into account as well. But the association between the layer of contemporary states and the survey responses remains independent of earlier legacies because these preconfigure but do not predetermine the effects of more recent states.



**Figure 3:** Neutralizing/independence. *Note:* In this configuration of layers, the historical states C and B do not shape the surface topography, which is determined exclusively by contemporary state A.



**Figure 4:** Amplifying/preconfiguring. *Note:* In this configuration of layers, each state is reinforcing the effects that the previous state had on the surface topography.

### *Example for the Three Types of Moderation*

To identify cases of preserving/predetermining, neutralizing/independence, and amplifying/preconfiguring in the hierarchical models of Tables 6 and 7, let us look at how the coefficients and standard errors associated with the duration of membership in a state change once other layers of political history are introduced. Bracketing the possible uncertainty created by posttreatment and omitted variable biases, does the association with trust, conservatism, and altruism/universalism increase or decrease or remain unchanged when more layers of history are considered? And is this difference statistically significant?<sup>12</sup> The combination of these two pieces of information allows us to identify the three types of layering, if in a rather preliminary way given that the estimates may (or may not) be affected by posttreatment and/or omitted variable biases. Note that the following examples do not represent “case studies”; that is, they simply serve to illustrate that different types of layering may indeed exist, rather than trying to give a historical account of how it happens in these specific cases. I therefore also refrain from interpreting why a specific state left a legacy on some outcomes (say levels of trust) but not on others. In Tables 6 and 7, the examples mentioned below are shaded in light gray.

If the relationship between strata is one of preservation, the coefficient for a particular state should remain stable across models in the forward-looking perspective. From Table 6, we can use the Byzantine Empire as an example. The size of the coefficient in the models with trust as a dependent variable fluctuates a bit across models. But this fluctuation moves within a narrow band (especially until the most recent predecessor state such as the Ottoman Empire is introduced) and does not result in a significant difference between the first and last coefficients. In other words, the Ottoman Empire, and its successor states on the former Byzantine domains (Alba-



nia, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Turkey) did not fundamentally alter the legacies left perhaps by the Byzantine tradition of distant and fragmented government: a slightly less trusting population. Hungary exemplifies the same configuration of layering, but this time looking backward (as in the models of Table 7): the association between the number of years ruled by Hungary and trusting less in others and being more conservative decreases significantly as soon as we take into account that the country was previously ruled (in stratum B) by the Habsburgs and thus shares many cultural dispositions (including trusting less and being more conservative) with other formerly Habsburg provinces. Before the Habsburgs, many Hungarian regions were ruled by the Ottomans (stratum C), which might have already left a legacy of distrust and more conservatism.

The second configuration of layers appears as “neutralizing” in the forward-looking perspective and as “independence” (from previous layers) in the backward-looking perspective. To illustrate the former, let us look at the Roman Empire (on Roman legacies in contemporary Germany, see Fritsch et al. 2020). The populations of regions formerly part of the empire are more altruistic/universalist than average Europeans. As soon as we take subsequent layers of successor states into account, however, the Roman influence becomes less and less pronounced until it is no longer significantly associated with the outcome variable. The difference between the first and the last coefficient is itself statistically significant, if only weakly so. For the backward-looking models, I choose the example of the Russian Empire. The association between less altruism/universalism and more years under Romanov rule increases significantly the more predecessor states we take into account, such as Sweden or Denmark, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Livonian Confederation, the State of the Teutonic Order, the Ottoman or Habsburg Empires, Prussia, or the old Kingdoms of Hungary or Poland. The Romanov legacy, in other words, appears to be independent from these earlier strata of history.

The third configuration of layers appears, from the forward-looking perspective, as an amplification of the effects of older legacies when newer ones are taken into account. The coefficient of the number of years ruled by this older state should significantly increase across models. The Kingdom of Spain provides an example. The association with less general trust increases when we take into account that the regions in Belgium, the Netherlands, and southern Italy once ruled from Madrid subsequently became governed by the Habsburg, by the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, or by the Prince-Bishopric of Liège. Note, however, that the coefficient again decreases slightly (but remains significantly larger than in the first model) when we take contemporary states into account as well. Looking backward, the Kingdom of Sardinia (which included the core provinces of the Piedmont) offers an example. The positive association with generalized trust remains largely unaffected if we include predecessor states into the equation, such as the Duchy of Savoy, Spain, and the Duchy of Milan, as well as the Carolingian and Roman Empires (the coefficient just misses standard levels of significance in the last model, however).

### *Frequency of Different Types of Layering*

Which of these types of relationships are more frequent overall, looking beyond the illustrative cases given above? We can sketch an answer by analyzing how the coefficients of historical and contemporary states change in Tables 6 and 7, obviously reducing the analysis to those states that appear in at least two models, that is, that were significant for at least one outcome in at least one model. This generates a universe of 252 coefficients whose change across models with different historical strata we can analyze. Distinguishing between strongly increasing or decreasing coefficients (with coefficient changes above the average), weakly increasing or decreasing coefficients (coefficient changes below the average), and insignificant changes across models, we arrive at the following count (Table 9).

The three different types of layering make up each between 14 and 29 percent of all configurations if we count both smaller and larger changes in the coefficients across model specifications. Note, however, that this analysis is based on the difference between the first and the last models in the backward- and forward-looking series of Tables 6 and 7, respectively. It is not infrequent, however, for a coefficient to first increase from model to model and then decrease (or the other way around), indicating (if we again bracket possible posttreatment bias) that different types of layering are simultaneously operating between a focal state and the states of other strata that preceded or succeeded it, as in the case of Spain discussed above. I leave these complexities on the side for now and simply note that the rather simple method used above very likely undercounts cases of layering. I also note here that the differences between coefficients across models are often small, on average between three and four percent of a standardized coefficient. It therefore makes sense to only identify larger than average changes with any of the three types of layering, which reduces their share to somewhere between five and eight percent each. Still, the types of layering identified earlier in this section could be frequent enough to warrant our attention. A layered history approach, in other words, adds to our understanding of how the past affects the present.

### **Which States Leave Legacies?**

Looking back at Tables 6 and 7, we notice that some states shaped European attitudes in significant ways, whereas others did not. For example, Table 7 shows

**Table 9:** Frequency of types of layering

	Forward-looking	Percent	Backward-looking	Percent	Average
Strongly Weakly	Preserving	45	Predetermining	8 33	29
Strongly Weakly	Neutralizing	5 26	Independence	7 18	14
Strongly Weakly	Amplifying	7 18	Preconfiguring	33	19

that of the stratum B states, the Habsburg Empire, Denmark, the Sultanate of Egypt, the Duchy of Lorraine, the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Sardinia (after Napoleon), the Duchy of Savoy, the Archbishopric of Salzburg, Spain, and the Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman left their mark on the dispositions of contemporary Europeans. Why these and not other states of stratum B, such as the Ottoman Empire or Prussia?

We enter entirely new territory here, as existing research has exclusively focused on states that did leave legacies and then pointed at specific characteristics of these states as well as the channels through which their impact was transmitted across generations. In the following, I offer a preliminary analysis of this question and, more importantly, some suggestions for future research. Empirically, I again rely on Tables 6 and 7 to calculate the average effect size for each state separately for forward- and backward-looking model series, excluding coefficients below standard levels of significance from consideration. Because I am using standardized (beta) coefficients in all models, this should give us a rough estimate of how strongly having been a member of a certain polity is associated with contemporary attitudes. I then sum these two average effect sizes, thus giving more weight to variables that are significant in both the forward- and backward-looking models and averaging over models that err on the side of omitted variable biases and those with possibly larger posttreatment biases. To make this task manageable, I also average across different outcomes and thus do not ask the more precise question of which states affected contemporary levels of trust, which ones conservative values, and which ones altruistic/universalist dispositions.

What are possible factors that could affect the propensity of a state to shape its subjects' attitudes in durable ways? It is impossible to evaluate this question for all states that ruled over Europe since the early 1500 without a massive effort at generating new data. For this preliminary analysis, I content myself with information about timing, which is available in the European history data set used above, with a crude typology of states widely accepted in historical sociology, and with two more precise indicators that are available for enough states to warrant an empirical test. Another limitation to be addressed by future data collection efforts is that the following analysis will not be time varying, as the units of observation are states, not state-periods. Thus, the consequences of Habsburg rule in the early 1600s are not distinguished from those occurring in the late 1800s, although the administrative, political, and cultural institutions of the empire had changed quite markedly over these three centuries. For the present analysis, I simply average across the entire duration of a state's existence.

A number of candidate hypotheses come to mind to explain how deep and lasting the impacts of states are. First, many would expect that the average duration of their rule and their recency should affect how much they are associated with contemporary attitudes. These two measures can be calculated with precision using the political history data set assembled for this project. Model (1) in Table 10 reveals, however, that neither the length of a state's rule nor the average year in which it ended are factors shaping to what extent it is associated with contemporary attitudes. This supports the idea, developed in the section on variance components above, that older layers of history can be as consequential as more recent ones.

**Table 10:** Which states leave legacies? (Linear regression of the average size of significant coefficients in Tables 6 and 7)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average duration of rule	-0.144 (0.000)				
Average year when rule ended	0.088 (0.000)				
Tribal confederacy (omitted category: dynastic states)		-0.081 (0.043)			
Empire		0.09 (0.029)			
Theocracy		-0.046 (0.043)			
Modern nation-state		0.318* (0.023)			
Number of years with conscript army since 1816 and zero before French revolution (Toronto 2007)			0.338* (0.000)		
Number of wars fought with conscript armies with zero before French revolution (Lyll 2020)			-0.139 (0.002)		
Years with compulsory education				0.257* (0.000)	
State with a Communist past					0.030 (0.031)
State with a fascist past					0.135 (0.028)
Observations	87	89	76	73	89
R-squared	0.036	0.113	0.079	0.066	0.021

*Notes:* Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors in parenthesis; constants omitted; †  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ . Sources: The data on military conscription are from Toronto (2007) and Lyll (2020). Years of compulsory education were calculated based on a variety of sources (Benavot and Riddle 1988; Soysal and Strang 1989; Ziblatt 2008; Cinnirella and Hornung 2016; Lee and Lee 2016; Paglayan 2021; Postigliola and Rota 2021).

Second, I consider the basic structural character of the state, combining its principles of legitimacy with the social groups that control it. In states with a tribal foundation, its ruling coalitions are the leaders of the various tribal segments that have entered into a confederate alliance. The legitimizing ideology can be dynastic (as with the various khanates of pre-Imperial Russia) or ethnic (as with the Confederacy of the White Sheep Turkoman in Eastern Anatolia). Theocracies are ruled by religious authorities (such as an archbishop or a Christian military order) and in the name of the defense and promotion of a religion (such as Catholicism). Another, more frequent type of state is governed by dynasties of dukes, kings, or princes, whose ruling coalition includes their own extended families and usually also a stratum of noblemen who dominate the court. The legitimizing ideology is familial: a king or queen is entitled to rule because his or her father or mother was the king or the queen. Empires represent a subtype of dynastic regimes,

characterized by a large and multiethnic population and a differentiation between core and periphery that other dynastic states often lack. Modern nation-states are ruled in the name of a nationally defined people, rather than God or a dynasty, and are typically governed by a more varied coalition that includes educated elites as well as professionals and entrepreneurs.

The guiding hypotheses here is that nation-states should be much more consequential than all other types of states, as they intend to transform their subjects into national citizens with a specific cultural orientation and often develop the institutional capacity to do so. Model (2) supports this argument: nation-states are more strongly associated with contemporary attitudes than all other types of states (the omitted category is dynastic states).<sup>13</sup>

Models (3) and (4) explore if the nation-state effect does indeed have to do with their institutional capacity, a third possible factor to explain legacy effects of states. More precisely, many nation-states socialize their citizens through mandatory military service (Weber 1979) or a system of public education (Weber 1979; Darden forthcoming). I draw on different data sources to see if states relying on universal conscription to recruit soldiers or that provided compulsory primary education shaped the attitudes of citizens in more important ways. Again, we find some support for this hypothesis. At least the number of years with universal conscription during a state's existence is associated with the impact on contemporary attitudes, whereas the number of wars fought with conscript armies is not—perhaps indicating that regular military training of adult males shapes attitudes independently of whether the army ends up going to war. The number of years during which a state had mandatory primary education (based not on laws but on actual policies) is positively associated with state impact.

This analysis has its obvious limitations, as both compulsory education and universal conscription are relatively recent inventions of the post-Napoleonic period, thus failing to explain why many older states left significant imprints on today's attitudes as well. Correspondingly, the above results hold if we limit the sample to states that continued to exist after the invention of universal conscription and compulsory mass education (results not shown). They are thus not driven by the contrast with older states, thus reinforcing the idea that other, non-observed characteristics determine the latter's impact. Future data work should thus focus on the capacity of old and new states alike. Interestingly, the above results disappear, however, if we add the dummy variable for modern nation-states (results not shown). It is thus unclear if it is really state capacity or other, unmeasured aspects of modern nation-states that drive the results.

Fourth and following this line of reasoning, citizens could be more receptive to the attitude-shaping policies and discourses of states if their ruling coalitions are larger, which is usually the case in modern nation-states. This is at least what we expect from an exchange theoretic or contract theoretic perspective on how states and citizens interact with each other (see, e.g., Wimmer 2018). Unfortunately, we again lack data to explore this argument. Even Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), the historically most comprehensive data set, includes only eight of the historical states considered above. It would be desirable to expand the V-Dem data on the size of the ruling coalition, on which social groups (such as the aristocracy) the regime is

based, whether or not legally encoded serfdom or slavery existed, to what extent equal rights were granted to which types of citizens, and so on.

Fifth, one could distinguish states from each other based on whether or not they pursue a mission to transform their societies. In contrast to state capacity, this refers to the intention of ruling elites, that is, whether or not they develop a transformative social and cultural agenda, trying to shape the mores and lifestyles of their subjects. Such agendas emerged within both religious and secular frameworks of legitimacy. For example, Protestant rulers such as the Prussian kings or Dutch burghers sought to instill pious, Calvinist values into their subjects, a motivation that guided their state-building efforts in no small way (Gorski 2003). Communist regimes had an extensive agenda to instill revolutionary, proletarian values into their citizens and combat older, Christian or bourgeois normative orientations and behavioral patterns (Ignácz 2018). Many fascist regimes also embarked on massive projects to change the cultural outlook and everyday behavioral dispositions of their citizens, often dreaming of creating a new kind of humankind (for Italy, see Dagnino 2016). Without extensive historical research, this argument again cannot be subjected to a serious test. For illustrative purposes, I simply coded whether states were ruled by a Communist party or not and whether they ever had a fascist regime. Model (4) reveals that these states don't show a larger association with contemporary attitudes than non-Communist and non-fascist states. Future work should systematically code rulers' intentions and missions beyond the case of Communist and fascist regimes. And it should explore whether the combination of state capacity and intention is necessary to shape citizen's attitudes in lasting ways.

This analysis mainly served illustrative purposes: to demonstrate that the multiple legacies perspective opens up a whole set of new and researchable questions as soon as we abandon the focus on positive results, that is, on states that did in fact leave a legacy. Beyond the range of candidate hypotheses introduced above, one could imagine other state characteristics that could explain their varied imprint on the population and how long this imprint lasts: legal systems that shape what to expect from everyday interactions in durable ways; local-level policing that affects normative expectations and their level of internalization; the degree to which bureaucracies operate according to Weberian principles, shaping citizens attitudes toward the state and each other; and so forth.

## Summary and Outlook

This article introduced the idea of multiple, layered legacies and illustrated its plausibility with quantitative data linking the history of Europe's regions to contemporary attitudes measured by the European Social Survey. The concept of multiple, layered histories, I argued, opens up four new avenues of research. First, it led us to compare across types of histories and to evaluate which ones may leave more consequential traces: Is it the history of how religious organizations tried to shape the attitudes and behavior of their flocks long centuries ago? Or is it the wars and other traumatic violence that have punctuated the history of the European Continent so often and in such dramatic ways? Or should we look at how subsequent states have shaped the mentalities of European populations through their discourses and



policies? This article has explored, in a tentative way limited by the availability of data, these questions and found that political history—the succession of the many states that have ruled over various parts of Europe—is indeed a crucial part of understanding the Continent’s historical legacies. This obviously does not rule out that religions shape these attitudes as well, either through legacy effects (e.g., Grosjean 2011) or through constant causation, even if not through the policies of the medieval Catholic Church evaluated here.

The idea of multiple, layered legacies conjures up a second comparative dimension, that is, across the different strata of history: is it the case, as common sense would have it, that the more recent a history, the more it leaves a legacy? Tentatively, I answered this question in the negative. When looking at the entire period, no such recency effect appears. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the proportion of variance explained by older strata of states can be as large as that of younger states.

Third, the idea of layered legacies allows us to take into account how they possibly influence each other. I identified three basic types of such moderations. In the first type, older histories trump newer ones, with the latter simply preserving the effects of the former. In the second, opposite type, later historical periods trump previous ones by shaping contemporary attitudes independently of the past. Third, later layers may amplify the legacy effects of previous layers through a process of cumulative causation, each layer further accentuating the specificity of a population’s value orientations. As an empirical proof of concept for this typology, I looked at how the estimated legacy effects of a state change when introducing subsequent or previous layers of political history—whether they are neutralized, amplified, or left intact. I also offered some preliminary assessments of how frequently these various types of relationships between layers of history could be and found that they are numerous enough to warrant a more systematic exploration in the future.

Fourth, exploring multiple legacies encourages us to explore variation in the “legacy-proness” of history. Why did certain states leave a mark on the present, whereas others did not? Again in a tentative way and intended to stimulate future research rather than to make a specific empirical case, I developed a series of plausible hypotheses and tested some of them empirically. In line with basic expectations of modernization theory, I find that more capable states—in terms of their ability to coerce men into armies and children into schools—leave more pronounced legacies than other states. Similarly, modern nation-states—but not necessarily more recent ones—tend to shape their citizens’ attitudes in more consequential ways than dynastic, imperial, theocratic, or tribal states. However, the main purpose of this exercise was to ask the question that I hope future research will explore in more depth.

As repeatedly noted in the empirical discussion, the research design and data used to illustrate the usefulness of the idea of multiple, layered legacies had obvious limitations. It is exceedingly difficult to pin down the complexities of multiple legacies with precision and according to the exigencies of contemporary quantitative research practices. Power limitations and the general problem of posttreatment and/or omitted variable biases limit the degree to which we should confide in

individual estimates. The empirical analyses therefore served as proof of concept, rather than as a more ambitious empirical test of a theoretical argument. I hope that future research can go beyond what has been accomplished here. Multiple possible strategies come to mind.

First, one could overcome the power problems by enlarging the empirical universe beyond Europe and search for other surveys with regionally representative samples. The various barometers, the International Social Survey, or the World Values Survey are candidates for such an exercise, although it is unclear how many of these surveys contain representative samples at the level of subnational regions. If they do, the historical pasts of these regions could be coded in similar ways as we have attempted to do here. Secondly, one could shift the focus to smaller units of observations, such as counties or even municipalities, and choose regions with an interestingly multilayered history, for example, in Ukraine and other Eastern European countries where borders have often moved over peoples. Importantly, such a research design should maintain the goal of finding multiple layers of history and explore the interactions between them, not shying away from possible null findings, as legacies are as interesting, from the theoretical point of view established in this article, as are their absence.

Third, a fruitful avenue of future research would be to move away from survey data and look at local-level institutions: the ways fires are fought, local politics is organized, the poor or elderly are cared for, and so on. Considerable data work would have to be accomplished to achieve the necessary breadth and depth. Fourth and finally, one could go beyond the presentist focus on contemporary outcomes that using a survey forces upon us. One could code local institutional features in 2000, 1950, 1900, 1850, and so on. This would allow for a much more dynamic analysis of legacies, tracing them across time until they cease to be effective, identifying new ones that emerge until they are neutralized by even more recent political realities. Clearly, we are still far away from such fully specified, dynamic understanding of how history weaves together various causal strands into its ever-evolving tapestry.

## Notes

- 1 Another well-researched topic is the legacies of slavery in Africa (e.g., Nunn 2008) or the United States (e.g., O'Connell et al. 2020).
- 2 Similarly, Kotkin and Beissinger (2014) distinguish five modalities of how legacies emerge, further specifying the institutional modes of transmission identified by Simpson and coauthors.
- 3 For a detailed description of all the questions and value dimensions, including a summary of the development of the scale, see Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2008).
- 4 For references, see Wimmer and Soehl (2014).
- 5 These include fewer than 100 respondents in 6 of 13 regions in Greece, 10 of 26 in Italy, 4 of 17 in Spain, 4 of 21 in Sweden, and 10 of 26 in Ukraine.
- 6 These maps are available for each century. Using existing compendia, we made sure we did not miss states that existed between centuries, for example, from 1630 to 1690.
- 7 I leave out the Byzantine Empire as it is highly (and obviously negatively) correlated with Catholic Church policies.
- 8 With regard to trust, the results show that Catholics and Protestants trust others considerably more than individuals who did not answer the faith question, whereas Muslims trust others far less than other individuals who adhere to a religion. On the other hand, all religious individuals (regardless of their faith) are more conservative, Muslims far more so than Christians. Finally, religious individuals are also more altruistic/universalist than nonreligious individuals, Muslims again far more so than Christians.
- 9 In a handful of cases where the territories of subsequent states perfectly overlap and there is also no variation across regions in years of membership, earlier states are dropped in the backward-looking models and the later ones in the forward-looking models. This is a problem mostly for the three Baltic states (whose borders in the interwar and the post-Soviet period are coextensive) and for Portugal (before and after the Spanish interlude). In another small group of cases, earlier states are highly correlated (above 0.6) with successor states but don't drop out of the models: the Kingdom of Bohemia with Czechoslovakia as well as with the Czech Republic; Poland before and after partition; pre-British Irish Earldoms and contemporary Ireland; Romanov Russia and the Soviet Union; former Yugoslavia and Croatia (because there are only two Yugoslav successor states in the data set); the early modern Kingdom of Hungary and contemporary Hungary; and the Kingdom of Denmark and contemporary Norway.
- 10 Another posttreatment problem is that of heterogeneous treatment effects: it could be that an older state, for example, by applying policies differently across the territory, had different consequences for different regions, which in turn could map onto contemporary states. This creates the risk of misattributing variation to contemporary states that was de facto generated by the regionally varying effects of an earlier state.
- 11 Note that these variance proportions are calculated net of the regional controls, which are not separated out, however, in panels 2 and 3 (they are obviously the same as in panel 1).
- 12 To answer this question, I use the following formula (Paternoster et al. 1998):  $\frac{\text{Coeff1} - \text{Coeff2}}{\sqrt{\text{SD1}^2 + \text{SD2}^2}}$ , where Coeff1 refers to the coefficient of the first model, Coeff2 to the coefficient of the second model, and the same for the standard deviations SD1 and SD2.
- 13 It's noteworthy that the nation-state dummy retains significance in a model that also includes a control for recency.

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**Acknowledgments:** I thank Berenike Firestone and Jiyeon Chang for outstanding research assistance in creating the political history data set and for comments on a first draft; Thomas Soehl and Ka U Ng for assembling a merged data set with the ESS variables; Flavien Ganther for guidance on how to describe the statistical models; Sang Won Han as well as Jack la Violette for creating the geocoded battlefield data set; and Sidney Hemming for encouraging my use of geological metaphors.

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