A1   Data collection and country table

Table A1 lists all participants' home countries. Countries which the World Bank (2018b) in 2017 ranked as "high income" are labeled "rich," World Bank's "low-" and "middle-income" countries are labeled "poor," respectively.

We measure cultural distances using Hofstede's six-dimensional scale of national culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010), comprising six indicators: the Power Distance Index, Individualism Index, Masculinity Index, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Long Term Orientation Index, and the Indulgence versus Restraint Index (data retrieved from Hofstede Insights 2018). More precisely, we quantify dyadic cultural distance as the mean of the six-dimensional Euclidean distances between the focal participant's home country and each of the five potential counterpart countries displayed on screen.

Table A1, columns 3 and 4, lists the average cultural distance of participants in a particular country from the poor or rich countries displayed on screen. Note that we varied the list of displayed counterpart countries, and thus the relevant cultural distances, for participants within the same country. Blanks indicate unavailability of the Hofstede scale for this country. The column labeled N shows the number of participants in each country.

Table A1: Countries.

Country	Rich	Cultural distance to poor	Cultural distance to rich	N	Country	Rich	Cultural distance to poor	Cultural distance to rich	N
Albania	0	293	426	6	Macedonia	0			14
Algeria	0			5	Malaysia	0	296	461	9
Argentina	1	306	363	6	Mali	0			1
Australia	1	465	341	22	Malta	1	271	319	3
Austria	1	448	306	5	Mauritius	0			3
Bahrain	1			3	Mexico	0	386	471	44
Bangladesh	0	237	412	2	Moldova	0			3
Barbados	1			2	Morocco	0	306	399	5
Belgium	1	365	326	6	Mozambique	0	402	509	1
Belize	0			1	Namibia	0			1
Bolivia	0			2	Nepal	0	317	395	5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0			3	Netherlands	1	457	357	9
Brazil	0	235	334	37	New Zealand	1	470	266	10
Bulgaria	0	313	382	8	Nicaragua	0			2
Cameroon	0			1	Nigeria	0	342	457	22
Canada	1	412	299	97	Norway	1	466	425	1
Chile	1	316	435	6	Pakistan	0	323	443	16
Colombia	0	346	488	16	Panama	1			2
Costa Rica	0			1	Paraguay	0			2
Croatia	1	224	366	5	Peru	0	250	432	2
Cyprus	1			2	Philippines	0	314	439	75
Czech Republic	1	294	271	5	Poland	1	281	347	10
Denmark	1	542	429	4	Portugal	1	299	447	19
Dominica	0			4	Qatar	1			2
Dominican Republic	0	317	419	8	Romania	0	240	438	18
Ecuador	0			4	Russia	0	326	443	14
Egypt	0	360	511	12	Saint Kitts and Nevis	1			1
El Salvador	0	345	503	3	Saint Lucia	0			2
Estonia	1	379	338	3	Saint Vincent	0			1
Ethiopia	0			2	Saudi Arabia	1	228	437	5
Finland	1	377	319	12	Serbia	0	263	428	20
France	1	307	305	36	Singapore	1	385	476	14
Georgia	0			3	Slovakia	1	395	439	3
Germany	1	396	280	24	Slovenia	1	258	424	5
Ghana	0	375	526	2	South Africa	0	349	274	22
Greece	1	249	355	17	Spain	1	250	309	31
Guatemala	0			3	Sri Lanka	0	255	387	4
Hong Kong	1	288	405	2	Sweden	1	524	451	9
Hungary	1	423	247	1	Switzerland	1	402	247	3
Iceland	1	418	380	1	Taiwan	1	341	356	3
India	0	283	354	263	Tanzania	0	253	386	1
Indonesia	0	251	408	13	Thailand	0	251	415	4
Ireland	1	457	329	13	Trinidad and Tobago	1	353	456	12
Israel	1			5	Tunisia	0			3
Italy	1	363	284	45	Turkey	0	239	342	21
Jamaica	0			15	Uganda	0			3
Japan	1	387	401	1	Ukraine	0	338	474	6
Jordan	0	267	420	2	United Arab Emirates	1			8
Kazakhstan	0			2	United Kingdom	1	475	325	96
Kenya	0			10	United States	1	461	293	228
Korea (Republic)	1	349	458	3	Uruguay	1	288	405	2
Kuwait	1			1	Venezuela	0	379	536	93
Latvia	1	434	410	3	Vietnam	0	313	420	8
Lithuania	1	397	388	12	Zambia	0	265	367	1
Luxembourg	1	339	265	2					
					Total: 109 = 58 poor + 51 rich				1,674

Note: Rich: country ranked as "high income" in 2017 by the World Bank (2018b). Cultural distance: based on Hofstede's six-dimensional model of national culture (Hofstede et al. 2010).

A2   Decision sequences

Each participant played both games, the dictator game (DG) and the trust game (TG), with a counterpart from the same country, a poor country, and a rich country. We randomized the order of decision situations to achieve a balanced dataset comprising all possible sequences (see Table A2). The first decision situation was either the DG or the TG. In the DG, everyone made the decisions in the role of a dictator but might also find themselves recipients of payment. In the TG, each participant acted, first, as a first-moving trustor and then as a trustee without information about the counterpart's country. To elicit back-transfers, we employed the strategy method (Rauhut, and Winter 2010), asking trustees to respond to all possible transfers by the first mover (see Section A5). We refrained from using the standard measure of trustee behavior (second player's response to actual transfer) in order not to censor the response variable.

Table A2: Randomized decision sequences.

First game	Order of counterpart countries			N_{poor}	N_{rich}
DG	own	poor	rich	74	68
DG	own	rich	poor	71	67
DG	poor	own	rich	72	66
DG	poor	rich	own	71	70
DG	rich	own	poor	72	67
DG	rich	poor	own	68	71
TG	own	poor	rich	73	66
TG	own	rich	poor	78	62
TG	poor	own	rich	62	75
TG	poor	rich	own	65	77
TG	rich	own	poor	72	69
TG	rich	poor	own	76	62
Total				854	820

Note: The last two columns contain the respective sequence's sample size in poor and rich countries (see Section A1).

A3   Control variables

For the within-subject design (Figure 1A), control variables are unnecessary as each participant serves as her own "control group." The randomization of decision sequences guarantees that each type of decision (game and counterpart) has equal probability of being a participant's first decision, unaffected by prior decisions in the experiment (see Section A2). Hence, the tests reported in the results section of the main text are paired t-test, comparing each participant's decisions with another decision by that same participant.

We use control variables (Table A3) only when examining the characteristics of the countries displayed on screen (see Figures 1B and 2). The selection of countries on display is a randomized treatment but resembles a between-subject design.

Table A3: Control variables.

Variable	Description	Mean	SD
Randomized treatments			
Decision sequence	DG as first decision (0,1)	0.50	
	Poor before rich counterpart countries (0,1)	0.50	
Cultural distance to *poor* countries	Average Euclidean distance in the Hofstede scale between a participant's country and the *poor* countries on display	71.70	16.40
Cultural distance to *rich* countries	Average Euclidean distance in the Hofstede scale between a participant's country and the *rich* countries on display	73.26	15.84
GDP difference	Difference in GDP per capita (World Bank 2018a) between the rich and the poor countries displayed to the participant	26,776.07	1,792.78
Observed characteristics			
GDP	GDP (World Bank 2018a) of the participant's home country	30,383.04	21,053.01
Rich country	Home country ranked as "high income" in year 2017 by the World Bank (2018b) (0,1)	0.51	
Gender	Female (0,1)	0.34	
Age	In years	32.17	9.20
Education	College degree and higher (0,1)	0.65	
	Currently student (0,1)	0.22	
Income	Monthly disposable income in PPP\$/$\sqrt{\text{household members}}$	2,018.64	1,904.39
Employment	Fully employed (0,1)	0.61	
Parenthood	$\geq$1 Child (0,1)	0.33	
Trust	Generalized trust, self-evaluation (0–10)	4.88	2.77
Risk	Risk-seeking, self-evaluation (0–10)	5.44	2.58
Scientific motivation	I want to support scientific research. – Strongly agree (0,1)	0.33	
Monetary motivation	I want to earn money. – Strongly agree (0,1)	0.53	
Non-naïveté	Number of incentivized experiments participated before	23.53	290.07
Participation	At home (0,1)	0.86	
	Observed by others (0,1)	0.05	
Control questions	>3 Mistakes in the DG or the TG (0,1)	0.35	

A4   Regression table

Table A4 contains the regression results underlying Figs. 1B and 2 using the control variables described in Table A3. The dependent variable is the treatment effect calculated as transfer to poor vs. transfer to rich countries ($\hat{Y}_{mean}$).

Table A4: Regressions for gradual impact of wealth differences and cultural distances.

		$DG_{poor}-DG_{rich}$		$TG_{poor}-TG_{rich}$	
		$\hat{\beta}$	(t)	$\hat{\beta}$	(t)
$\hat{Y}_{mean}$		1.304***	(3.79)	−.931*	(2.06)
Counterpart countries' characteristics					
Cultural distance to	poor countries	−.058	(1.91)	−.067	(1.70)
	rich countries	.067*	(2.52)	.032	(.90)
GDP difference (log)		2.342	(.45)	−3.496	(.50)
Ego's characteristics					
GDP (log)		−.497	(.48)	.426	(.31)
Rich		1.576	(.92)	−1.100	(.44)
Female		.093	(.12)	.646	(.71)
Age	18–22 (reference)				
	23–29	−1.609	(1.01)	−2.228	(1.26)
	30–45	−1.062	(.64)	−.879	(.48)
	≥46	−1.981	(.95)	−.270	(.12)
College degree and higher		−.084	(.11)	−.906	(.90)
Student		−.833	(.73)	1.533	(1.25)
Income (log)		.093	(.24)	−.033	(.07)
Fully employed		−.083	(.10)	.588	(.58)
Parenthood		−.483	(.59)	.289	(.27)
General trust		−.222	(1.70)	−.027	(.15)
Risk-seeking		−.023	(.17)	−.085	(.46)
Scientific motivation		.439	(.55)	1.140	(1.17)
Monetary motivation		−.244	(.34)	−.361	(.40)
Non-naïveté		−.000	(.89)	.000	(.75)
Participation at home		−.116	(.12)	−2.208	(1.53)
Participation observed by others		−2.968	(1.60)	−2.787	(1.24)
>3 Mistakes in the DG or the TG		−.712	(.86)	.966	(.92)
DG first		−.289	(.42)	1.287	(1.43)
Poor before rich		1.368*	(2.00)	2.178*	(2.41)
N		1,557		1,557	

Note: OLS regressions of preference toward the poor over the rich in first-mover behavior in the dictator game (DG) and in the trust game (TG). We report mean $\hat{Y}$, unstandardized coefficients and t-values calculated from robust standard errors (in parentheses).

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

A5   Experimental instruction and decision screens

Dictator game instructions

Task 1

Please read these instructions carefully.

For this decision task, you have been randomly matched to interact with another Mechanical Turk worker.
None of you will know the other participant's worker ID.

We will provide $2 to each pair of players.

Player A decides how to divide this money between him- or herself and Player B.
Player A must allocate between $0 and the total $2 to Player B.

Player B takes home as a bonus whatever Player A allocates to him or her.
Player A gets whatever he or she does not allocate to Player B.

You will see an example on the next page.

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Dictator game animation

Task 1

Here is an example:

Once Player A has made a decision, the interaction is over.
Then, neither player will be able to affect the other's earnings.

You will be Player A. You will take three decisions in this task.

Each time, you will be matched to another Mechanical Turk worker.
You will not know the other participants' worker IDs. The other participants will not know your worker ID.

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Dictator game decision, counterpart from the same country

Task 1, decision 1

You are Player A.
Player B is a Mechanical Turk worker **from Germany**.

Please divide the $2.

The decision you take will determine the amount of money you earn from this HIT.

					Which amount do you send to Player B?					
$0.00	$0.20	$0.40	$0.60	$0.80	$1.00	$1.20	$1.40	$1.60	$1.80	$2.00
○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○

Show instructions again.

Next

Dictator game decision, counterpart from poor country

Task 1, decision 2

You are Player A.
This time **Player B** is a Mechanical Turk worker **from Brazil, Bulgaria, Serbia, China, or the Philippines.**

Please divide the $2.

The decision you take will determine the amount of money you earn from this HIT.

					Which amount do you send to Player B?					
$0.00	$0.20	$0.40	$0.60	$0.80	$1.00	$1.20	$1.40	$1.60	$1.80	$2.00
○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○

Show instructions again.

Next

Dictator game decision, counterpart from rich country

Task 1, decision 3

You are Player A.
This time **Player B** is a Mechanical Turk worker **from Japan, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, or Canada.**

Please divide the $2.

The decision you take will determine the amount of money you earn from this HIT.

	Which amount do you send to Player B?									
$0.00	$0.20	$0.40	$0.60	$0.80	$1.00	$1.20	$1.40	$1.60	$1.80	$2.00
○	○	○	⊙	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Show instructions again.

Next

Dictator game control questions

Task 1

The following control questions are designed for your understanding.

You must answer these questions correctly to have the HIT approved.
In case of mistakes, you may correct your answers.

Suppose, Player A sends $0.20 to Player B. In this case, what is the bonus Player B takes home?

$0.00	$0.20	$0.40	$0.60	$0.80	$1.00	$1.20	$1.40	$1.60	$1.80	$2.00
○	⊙	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

✓

Suppose, Player A sends $1.60 of his or her $2.00 to Player B. In this case, what is bonus Player A takes home?

$0.00	$0.20	$0.40	$0.60	$0.80	$1.00	$1.20	$1.40	$1.60	$1.80	$2.00
○	○	○	⊙	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

✗ Wrong answer.
Please correct.

Trust game instructions

Task 2

Please read these instructions carefully.

For this decision task, you have been randomly matched to interact with another Mechanical Turk worker, different from the persons you interacted with before.
None of you will know the other participant's worker ID.

We will provide $1 to each player.

Player A decides how to divide his or her amount between him- or herself and Player B.
Player A must allocate between $0 and the total $1 to Player B.
This website then doubles the allocated amount and sends it to Player B.

Remember, Player B has (just like Player A) already received $1 from the experimenter.
In addition, Player B receives the doubled amount allocated to him or her by Player A.
Then, Player B decides how much of the doubled amount (between 0% and 100%) he or she sends back to Player A.

Player A takes home as a bonus $1 minus his or her allocation to Player B plus the amount Player B sends back.
Player B gets $1 plus the doubled amount allocated by Player A minus the amount he or she sends back to Player A.

You will see an example on the next page.

<div align="right">

`Next`

</div>

Trust game animation

Task 2

Here is an example:

Once both Players have made their decisions, the interaction is over.
Then, neither player will be able to affect the other's earnings.

In this task, you will participate in two roles: First you will take three decisions as Player A.
Each time, you will be matched to another Mechanical Turk worker.

Then, paired with a new Mechanical Turk worker, as Player B.
You will not know the other participants' worker IDs. The other participants will not know your worker ID.

`Back`   `Next`

Trust game trustor decision, counterpart from the same country

Task 2, decision 1

You are Player A.
Player B is a Mechanical Turk worker **from Germany**.

Please divide the $1.

The decision you take will determine the amount of money you earn from this HIT.

Which amount do you send to Player B?										
$0.00	$0.10	$0.20	$0.30	$0.40	$0.50	$0.60	$0.70	$0.80	$0.90	$1.00
○	○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○

Show instructions again.

Next

Trust game trustor decision, counterpart from poor country

Task 2, decision 2

You are Player A.
This time **Player B** is a Mechanical Turk worker **from Brazil, Bulgaria, Serbia, China, or the Philippines.**

Please divide the $1.

The decision you take will determine the amount of money you earn from this HIT.

Which amount do you send to Player B?										
$0.00	$0.10	$0.20	$0.30	$0.40	$0.50	$0.60	$0.70	$0.80	$0.90	$1.00
○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○

Show instructions again.

Next

Trust game trustor decision, counterpart from rich country

Task 2, decision 3

You are Player A.
This time **Player B** is a Mechanical Turk worker **from Japan, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, or Canada.**

Please divide the $1.

The decision you take will determine the amount of money you earn from this HIT.

Which amount do you send to Player B?										
$0.00	$0.10	$0.20	$0.30	$0.40	$0.50	$0.60	$0.70	$0.80	$0.90	$1.00
○	○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○

Show instructions again.

Next

Trustee decision

Task 2

You are now Player B.

You will be randomly matched to interact with another person, different from the persons you just interacted with.

While Player A divides his or her $1, please decide on how much you are willing send back to Player A for each of the possible amounts.

You cannot change your decision once you will be informed about Player A's actual allocation.

	0 %	10 %	20 %	30 %	40 %	50 %	60 %	70 %	80 %	90 %	100 %	You earn $1.00. In addition, you'd earn:
Player A allocates $0.00 to you. You receive $0.00 .					(No decision for you to take.)							$0.00
Player A allocates $0.10 to you. You receive $0.20.	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	$0.16
Player A allocates $0.20 to you. You receive $0.40.	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	$0.28
Player A allocates $0.30 to you. You receive $0.60.	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	$0.42
Player A allocates $0.40 to you. You receive $0.80.	○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	$0.48
Player A allocates $0.50 to you. You receive $1.00.	○	○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	$0.50
Player A allocates $0.60 to you. You receive $1.20.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Player A allocates $0.70 to you. You receive $1.40.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Player A allocates $0.80 to you. You receive $1.60.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Player A allocates $0.90 to you. You receive $1.80.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
Player A allocates $1.00 to you. You receive $2.00.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	
	0 %	10 %	20 %	30 %	40 %	50 %	60 %	70 %	80 %	90 %	100 %	

Show instructions again.

Next

Trust game control questions

Task 2

The following control questions are designed for your understanding.

You must answer these questions correctly to have the HIT approved.
In case of mistakes, you may correct your answers.

Suppose, Player A sends $0.80 of his or her $1.00 to Player B and Player B does not send anything back. In this case, what is the bonus Player A takes home?

$0.00	$0.10	$0.20	$0.30	$0.40	$0.50	$0.60	$0.70	$0.80	$0.90	$1.00
○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	✓

Suppose, Player A sends $0.40 to Player B. In this case, how much will Player B receive additional to his or her $1.00 (without sending anything back)?

$0.30	$0.40	$0.50	$0.60	$0.70	$0.80	$0.90	$1.00	$1.10	$1.20	$1.30
○	○	○	○	○	◉	○	○	○	○	○	✓

Next

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