

Supplement to:

Wakefield, Sara, and Lars Højsgaard Andersen. 2020. “Pretrial Detention and the Costs of System Overreach for Employment and Family Life.” *Sociological Science* 7: 342-366.

**SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL**

The supplementary material consists of three sections. Section A includes a table of results for family outcomes, Section B provides results for a variety of robustness tests, and Section C presents sensitivity analyses related to measurement timing decisions pre- and post-incarceration.

**SECTION A: SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS**

Table A.1. Results from estimations of the change in family outcomes by pretrial detention status.

Outcome	Live with partner			Live with children		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Before admission						
Convicted only (intercept)	0.239*** (0.003)	0.091 (0.051)	0.253*** (0.023)	0.232*** (0.003)	0.119** (0.042)	0.163*** (0.025)
Pretrial incarcerated	-0.101*** (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)		-0.098*** (0.011)	-0.013 (0.009)	
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	0.043*** (0.013)	0.007 (0.011)		0.044*** (0.013)	-0.001 (0.011)	
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	-0.019 (0.011)	0.008 (0.009)		-0.007 (0.011)	0.009 (0.009)	
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.010)		-0.007 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.010)	
After release						
Convicted only (post dum.)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Pretrial incarcerated	0.001 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	0.005 (0.007)	0.010 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.005 (0.008)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	0.012 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.011 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)	0.012 (0.010)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	-0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.008)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	0.000 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)
Fixed effects						
Control variables		X	X		X	X
Month and year		X	X		X	X
Individual			X			X
R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.255	0.004	0.018	0.290	0.002
N*T	150,374	150,374	3,759,350	150,374	150,374	3,759,350
N	75,187	75,187	75,187	75,187	75,187	75,187

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## SECTION B: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES

To analyze whether our main results are driven by specific subgroups in our data, we run a number of robustness checks. All robustness checks are set up using the same logic of inquiry. The model we estimate in our robustness analyses expands our analytic model in the main text by a set of interaction terms,  $R \times \text{Pretrial} \times .$ , where  $R$  is a dummy variable indicating that a person and case belongs to the specific subgroup which we are analyzing robustness for. Parameters marked by \* in the model below thus measure whether results for the subgroup ( $R = 1$ ) differ from results from those not in this subgroup ( $R = 0$ ), effectively testing for subgroup differences in our results. Except from the  $R$  terms, the model we estimate here is similar to the one we estimate in the main analyses.

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_{ict} = & \alpha_t \\
 & + \beta_t \text{Pretrial}_{ict} \\
 & + \gamma_t \text{Pretrial} \times \text{Notconvicted}_{ict} \\
 & + \delta_t \text{Pretrial} \times \text{Prison}_{ict} \\
 & + \theta_t \text{Pretrial} \times \text{Probation}_{ict} \\
 & + \beta_t^* R \times \text{Pretrial}_{ict} \\
 & + \gamma_t^* R \times \text{Pretrial} \times \text{Notconvicted}_{ict} \\
 & + \delta_t^* R \times \text{Pretrial} \times \text{Prison}_{ict} \\
 & + \theta_t^* R \times \text{Pretrial} \times \text{Probation}_{ict} \\
 & + \pi X_{ic} \\
 & + \rho Y M_{ic} \\
 & + \varepsilon_{ict}
 \end{aligned}$$

Tables B.1–B.6 report estimates from our robustness analyses by outcome. In all tables, Model 1 reprints our main results. We check whether our main results are robust to length of incarceration (two checks, one for incarcerations periods exceeding three months and one for periods exceeding six months); to time period (whether case was in 2002 or later); whether effects are stronger or weaker for people who are experiencing their first incarceration; whether results differ between the Copenhagen detention center (which is the largest facility that houses pretrial detainees) and other facilities (local arrests); and whether the main results are driven by the longest detention spells (four checks: longest 5 percent of spells; longest 10 percent; longest 25 percent; and longest 50 percent).

The overarching conclusion that we draw from results presented in this appendix is that our main results are robust to differences across the subgroups, although we do acknowledge that the estimates for the subgroups (interaction terms) are imprecisely estimated due to low number of observations in some of those subgroups.

Table B.1. Summary table of robustness analyses for labor earnings.

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Robustness description	Main results	> 3 months	> 6 months	After 2002	First spell	Copenhagen	Longest 5 pct.	Longest 10 pct.	Longest 25 pct.	Longest 50 pct.
Before admission										
Convicted only (intercept)	862.316*** (83.919)	871.817*** (84.349)	861.469*** (84.676)	862.758*** (83.960)	869.699*** (83.146)	860.227*** (83.822)	859.762*** (83.812)	859.479*** (83.780)	863.711*** (84.676)	863.286*** (83.481)
Pretrial incarcerated	-212.772*** (22.717)	-212.143*** (24.440)	-217.916*** (22.995)	-224.014*** (30.936)	-17.091 (27.642)	-156.129*** (31.514)	-214.934*** (22.620)	-214.654*** (22.730)	-216.008*** (23.056)	-228.241*** (28.448)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	59.603* (26.913)	68.470* (29.089)	69.783* (27.423)	48.211 (38.191)	20.447 (32.222)	41.647 (37.148)	63.728* (26.852)	63.078* (26.979)	68.450* (27.425)	87.686** (33.416)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	5.429 (21.861)	13.928 (24.308)	4.420 (22.380)	25.421 (30.081)	-46.906 (24.015)	-49.832 (30.920)	9.244 (21.781)	6.452 (21.910)	3.648 (22.384)	26.790 (29.008)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-16.940 (24.434)	57.267* (27.510)	15.515 (25.254)	54.695 (33.353)	-61.102* (27.525)	-101.602** (33.244)	-7.803 (24.465)	-6.022 (24.610)	6.919 (25.171)	97.828** (32.151)
<i>Robustness group effects</i>										
R X Pretrial incarcerated		-6.113 (59.810)	112.573 (121.632)	19.035 (44.311)	-258.937*** (43.781)	-142.663*** (41.067)	572.676 (664.398)	197.303 (290.138)	78.885 (120.002)	31.102 (43.371)
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted		-71.625 (75.982)	-207.349 (140.194)	15.532 (53.633)	70.938 (51.491)	39.966 (52.431)	-1188.463 (669.869)	-364.554 (323.609)	-208.344 (141.813)	-79.750 (56.464)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned		-5.006 (60.296)	-100.457 (121.837)	-37.285 (43.452)	93.388* (41.745)	107.368* (43.502)	-586.827 (664.553)	-190.464 (290.356)	-67.930 (120.219)	-37.292 (44.469)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction		-231.180*** (64.029)	-305.529* (124.936)	-151.937** (48.645)	84.258 (45.802)	251.018*** (49.677)	-743.633 (666.676)	-380.142 (293.971)	-267.085* (124.065)	-246.365*** (48.881)

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	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***	109.394***
After release												
Convicted only (post dummy)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)	(5.797)
Pretrial incarcerated	-124.957***	(25.482)	(26.966)	-120.719***	-117.984***	(32.192)	(28.450)	(35.941)	-140.588***	-121.896***	-120.870***	-122.540***
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	30.014	(30.283)	28.524	20.284	(30.568)	67.816	9.462	9.814	26.395	23.770	23.689	-11.002
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	-6.600	(25.157)	(32.252)	-12.147	-3.510	(40.685)	(37.561)	(41.605)	(30.238)	(30.386)	(30.523)	(37.073)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	3.568	(27.286)	54.464	(27.286)	(25.409)	(32.107)	(28.203)	(35.717)	(25.084)	(25.222)	(25.351)	(32.642)
	(27.508)	(30.378)	(30.378)	(28.085)	(28.085)	(35.415)	(31.418)	(37.962)	(27.535)	(27.684)	(27.956)	(35.580)
Robustness group effects												
R X Pretrial incarcerated	-26.847	(74.210)	(74.210)	(162.120)	(49.020)	23.723	3.363	39.410	-787.846	-421.664	-69.304	-99.954*
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	5.319	(90.290)	27.960	145.549	(162.311)	(49.710)	(48.401)	(50.402)	(661.043)	(294.493)	(177.609)	(51.164)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	27.960	(74.695)	(74.695)	(162.311)	(49.710)	(48.401)	(48.401)	(50.402)	(661.043)	(294.493)	(177.609)	(51.164)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-151.943	(77.821)	(77.821)	(164.948)	(54.533)	(52.059)	(52.059)	(55.302)	(663.495)	(298.986)	(180.578)	(55.207)
Fixed effects												
Control variables	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Month and year	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
R2	0.207	0.209	0.209	0.208	0.208	0.208	0.209	0.208	0.208	0.208	0.208	0.209
N*T	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374	150374
N	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187	75187

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

Table B.2. Summary table of robustness analyses for share with labor earnings.

Model	(1) Main results	(2) > 3 months	(3) > 6 months	(4) After 2002	(5) First spell	(6) Copenhagen	(7) Longest 5 pct.	(8) Longest 10 pct.	(9) Longest 25 pct.	(10) Longest 50 pct.
Before admission										
Convicted only (intercept)	0.573*** (0.045)	0.574*** (0.045)	0.571*** (0.045)	0.582*** (0.045)	0.566*** (0.045)	0.578*** (0.045)	0.572*** (0.045)	0.571*** (0.045)	0.571*** (0.045)	0.573*** (0.044)
Pretrial incarcerated	-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.072*** (0.013)	-0.080*** (0.012)	-0.111*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.033* (0.015)	-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.080*** (0.012)	-0.091*** (0.016)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	0.013 (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.021 (0.014)	0.022 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.018)	0.014 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.020 (0.014)	0.035* (0.018)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.013 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.050** (0.015)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.010 (0.016)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	0.008 (0.013)	0.041** (0.014)	0.026* (0.013)	0.068*** (0.019)	0.004 (0.020)	-0.034* (0.016)	0.011 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.022 (0.013)	0.077*** (0.017)
<i>Robustness group effects</i>										
R X Pretrial incarcerated	-0.030 (0.031)	-0.030 (0.055)	0.084 (0.055)	0.065** (0.023)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.023)	0.114 (0.237)	0.057 (0.138)	0.091 (0.057)	0.029 (0.023)
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.026 (0.063)	-0.163* (0.063)	-0.021 (0.028)	0.020 (0.028)	0.053 (0.028)	-0.328 (0.269)	-0.179 (0.160)	-0.186** (0.067)	-0.058* (0.028)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	0.031 (0.031)	-0.081 (0.055)	-0.081 (0.055)	-0.039 (0.023)	0.026 (0.023)	0.070** (0.025)	-0.138 (0.237)	-0.072 (0.138)	-0.090 (0.057)	-0.033 (0.024)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.088** (0.033)	-0.088** (0.057)	-0.184** (0.057)	-0.120*** (0.026)	0.003 (0.026)	0.105*** (0.026)	-0.182 (0.239)	-0.140 (0.141)	-0.190** (0.060)	-0.147*** (0.026)

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Table B.3. Summary table of robustness analyses for share living with partner.

Model	(1) Main results	(2) > 3 months	(3) > 6 months	(4) After 2002	(5) First spell	(6) Copenhagen	(7) Longest 5 pct.	(8) Longest 10 pct.	(9) Longest 25 pct.	(10) Longest 50 pct.
<i>Before admission</i>										
Convicted only (intercept)	0.091 (0.051)	0.096 (0.051)	0.093 (0.051)	0.090 (0.051)	0.096 (0.051)	0.094 (0.051)	0.091 (0.051)	0.092 (0.051)	0.094 (0.051)	0.091 (0.051)
Pretrial incarcerated	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.015)	0.017 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.013)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	0.007 (0.011)	0.010 (0.012)	0.008 (0.011)	0.019 (0.018)	0.037* (0.015)	-0.007 (0.014)	0.008 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)	0.000 (0.015)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	0.008 (0.009)	0.000 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.004 (0.015)	0.030** (0.012)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.005 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.014)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.016)	0.014 (0.014)	-0.024 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.014)
<i>Robustness group effects</i>										
R X Pretrial incarcerated		0.017 (0.024)	0.042 (0.047)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)	0.249 (0.182)	0.164 (0.114)	0.016 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.018)
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted		-0.023 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.055)	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.053* (0.022)	0.035 (0.023)	-0.318 (0.199)	-0.170 (0.127)	-0.016 (0.059)	0.012 (0.023)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned		-0.003 (0.025)	-0.028 (0.047)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.042* (0.018)	0.005 (0.020)	-0.212 (0.182)	-0.137 (0.114)	0.002 (0.049)	0.018 (0.019)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction		-0.048 (0.026)	-0.070 (0.048)	0.008 (0.020)	-0.048* (0.020)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.278 (0.183)	-0.206 (0.115)	-0.052 (0.051)	0.000 (0.020)

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Table B.4. Summary table of robustness analyses for share living with their children.

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Robustness description	Main results	> 3 months	> 6 months	After 2002	First spell	Copenhagen	Longest 5 pct.	Longest 10 pct.	Longest 25 pct.	Longest 50 pct.
<i>Before admission</i>										
Convicted only (intercept)	0.119** (0.042)	0.123** (0.042)	0.121** (0.042)	0.119** (0.042)	0.123** (0.042)	0.121** (0.042)	0.120** (0.042)	0.121** (0.042)	0.122** (0.042)	0.120** (0.042)
Pretrial incarcerated	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.023 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.012)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	-0.001 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)	0.011 (0.016)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.014)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	0.009 (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)	0.006 (0.009)	0.012 (0.013)	0.011 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.006 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.003 (0.012)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.013)
<i>Robustness group effects</i>										
R X Pretrial incarcerated	0.010 (0.024)	0.010 (0.024)	0.093 (0.053)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.040* (0.018)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.104)	-0.024 (0.046)	0.018 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.018)
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.083 (0.059)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.037 (0.021)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.120 (0.132)	0.011 (0.076)	0.006 (0.055)	-0.004 (0.022)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	0.002 (0.025)	0.002 (0.025)	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.039 (0.104)	0.050 (0.046)	-0.000 (0.046)	0.009 (0.018)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.029 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.026)	-0.098 (0.054)	-0.020 (0.019)	0.001 (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	0.017 (0.106)	0.043 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.047)	-0.012 (0.019)

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Table B.5. Summary table of robustness analyses for share convicted.

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Robustness description	Main results	> 3 months	> 6 months	After 2002	First spell	Copenhagen	Longest 5 pct.	Longest 10 pct.	Longest 25 pct.	Longest 50 pct.
<i>Before admission</i>										
Convicted only (intercept)	0.321*** (0.050)	0.319*** (0.050)	0.317*** (0.050)	0.331*** (0.050)	0.313*** (0.050)	0.320*** (0.050)	0.318*** (0.050)	0.317*** (0.050)	0.316*** (0.050)	0.318*** (0.050)
Pretrial incarcerated	0.184*** (0.012)	0.182*** (0.013)	0.187*** (0.012)	0.170*** (0.016)	0.075*** (0.014)	0.161*** (0.016)	0.185*** (0.012)	0.186*** (0.012)	0.186*** (0.012)	0.195*** (0.015)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.028* (0.014)	-0.028* (0.014)	-0.026 (0.014)	-0.035* (0.017)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	0.048*** (0.012)	0.039** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.042** (0.016)	0.023 (0.013)	0.072*** (0.016)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.012)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.023 (0.016)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.041** (0.013)	-0.044** (0.014)	-0.045*** (0.014)	-0.055** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.042** (0.013)	-0.043** (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.067*** (0.017)
<i>Robustness group effects</i>										
R X Pretrial incarcerated		0.016 (0.033)	-0.054 (0.058)	0.028 (0.024)	0.113*** (0.023)	0.057* (0.023)	-0.250 (0.130)	-0.086 (0.097)	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.023 (0.024)
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted		-0.040 (0.041)	0.025 (0.068)	-0.014 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.056* (0.028)	0.464* (0.184)	0.139 (0.127)	0.005 (0.073)	0.018 (0.029)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned		-0.000 (0.033)	0.049 (0.058)	0.011 (0.024)	0.045* (0.023)	-0.096*** (0.025)	0.205 (0.131)	0.056 (0.097)	0.019 (0.060)	0.039 (0.024)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction		0.001 (0.035)	0.067 (0.060)	0.032 (0.026)	-0.052* (0.025)	-0.036 (0.027)	0.250 (0.134)	0.096 (0.101)	0.046 (0.063)	0.056* (0.026)

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Table B.6. Summary table of robustness analyses for share arrested.

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Robustness description	Main results	> 3 months	> 6 months	After 2002	First spell	Copen-hagen	Longest 5 pct.	Longest 10 pct.	Longest 25 pct.	Longest 50 pct.
<b>Before admission</b>										
Convicted only (intercept)	0.357*** (0.058)	0.355*** (0.057)	0.352*** (0.058)	0.356*** (0.058)	0.361*** (0.058)	0.354*** (0.058)	0.354*** (0.057)	0.352*** (0.057)	0.351*** (0.057)	0.354*** (0.058)
Pretrial incarcerated	0.243*** (0.013)	0.243*** (0.014)	0.244*** (0.013)	0.258*** (0.017)	0.247*** (0.016)	0.225*** (0.017)	0.243*** (0.013)	0.242*** (0.013)	0.243*** (0.013)	0.265*** (0.017)
Pretrial inc. X Not convicted	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.020)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.032 (0.019)
Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned	0.042*** (0.012)	0.043*** (0.014)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.026 (0.017)	0.036* (0.014)	0.061*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.013)	0.024 (0.017)
Pretrial inc. X Other sanction	-0.053*** (0.014)	-0.044** (0.015)	-0.051*** (0.014)	-0.067*** (0.018)	0.020 (0.017)	-0.036* (0.018)	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.014)	-0.054*** (0.014)	-0.082*** (0.018)
<i>Robustness group effects</i>										
R X Pretrial incarcerated		0.001 (0.035)	0.005 (0.062)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.025)	0.047 (0.025)	0.251 (0.225)	0.216* (0.095)	0.014 (0.066)	-0.045 (0.025)
R X Pretrial inc. X Not convicted		-0.035 (0.043)	-0.075 (0.072)	0.005 (0.029)	-0.052 (0.028)	-0.038 (0.029)	-0.055 (0.253)	-0.219 (0.131)	-0.038 (0.078)	0.010 (0.031)
R X Pretrial inc. X Imprisoned		-0.002 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.062)	0.031 (0.025)	0.009 (0.024)	-0.062* (0.026)	-0.303 (0.225)	-0.253** (0.095)	-0.030 (0.066)	0.042 (0.025)
R X Pretrial inc. X Other sanction		-0.026 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.064)	0.028 (0.027)	-0.089*** (0.027)	-0.039 (0.028)	-0.289 (0.228)	-0.226* (0.100)	0.003 (0.069)	0.062* (0.028)

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### SECTION C: CHOICE OF PRE AND POST DETENTION MEASUREMENT POINTS

In this appendix we show that our main results for labor market outcomes are insensitive to the choice of pre and post detention measurement points. Results, such as ours, that rely on a common trends assumption are always likely to be sensitive to such choice. Our approach to showing that the main results – which compare the average labor market outcomes from the entire pre to post detention periods – are insensitive to *when* we measure pre and post outcomes is strictly empirical and simply consists in showing that when we chose all possible combinations of pre and post detention measurement points, the overall conclusion remains unaltered. We only report results from this sensitivity analysis for labor market outcomes because we only found substantial effects of pretrial detention (with and without conviction) for these outcomes, and because the family outcomes offer too few pre and post detention measurement points to conduct the following sensitivity analysis.

We have monthly measurement points for months -36 to -12 prior to detention and, similarly, for months +12 to +36 following detention. Taking the measurement point -36, for example, we have +12 to +36 (including both) = 25 possible post detention measurement points. We run our empirical model for the -36 measurement point and each of the 24 post detention points, and we then save the corresponding empirical estimates and their standard errors. We then redo this exercise for each of the pre detention points, resulting in a total of 625 estimates derived from all possible combinations of pre and post measurement points. Having this large number of point estimates obtained from the same statistical model allows us to draw the empirical distribution of point estimates that comes from analyzing all potential choices of pre and post detention measurement points. If our statistically significant main results were sensitive to the choice of measurement points, the empirical distribution of point estimates would show that our main results were likely to be “extreme” observations, i.e. fall in one of the tails of the empirical distributions.

Figure C.1 shows the distribution of the empirical estimates and confirms that the main results. For all combinations of measurement points we, in the left subfigures of Figure C.1, observe a statistically significant negative impact of experiencing pretrial detention on labor earnings and on employment (measured through the share with labor earnings). The right subfigures of Figure C.1 confirm that there are no statistically significant additional effects of being detained pretrial and then acquitted (we find both positive and negative estimates and all confidence intervals overlap with zero).



Figure C.1. Empirical distribution of effect estimates obtained from different choices of pre and post incarceration measurement points.

