

Supplement to:

Tsvetkova, Milena, and Michael W. Macy. 2015. "The Social Contagion of Antisocial Behavior." Sociological Science 2: 36-49.

### 1. Game instructions

# Participate in the Bonus Game

You are invited to participate in a research study on decision making called the "Bonus Game." You will receive a guaranteed \$0.25 base rate if you answer a short demographic survey, read the game instructions, and complete a five-question quiz on the instructions. If you correctly answer the quiz within three attempts, you will proceed to play the game.

Playing the game will pay you an additional \$0.50 for participation and give you the chance to earn an extra bonus of up to \$0.75. The extra amount you earn depends on your own and other participants' decisions. Reading the instructions and playing the game takes about 10 minutes.

Taking part in the study is completely voluntary. If you decide to take part now, you are free to withdraw at any time.

We do not anticipate any risks to you participating in the study other than those encountered in everyday use of the Internet. Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private; only the researchers will have access to the records. In any sort of report we make public we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you.

If you agree to the above conditions, please accept the HIT and go to https://sdlab.soc.cornell.cdu/study14/bgame/. You will need your MTurk worker ID so please copy it now (you can find it under "Your Account" tab). Once you have finished the game, you will be given a confirmation code. In order to get paid, you need to enter the confirmation code here and then submit the HIT.

### CONFIRMATION CODE:

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If you have questions, you may contact us at mvt9@cornell.edu. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the Cornell Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 607-255-5138 or access their website at http://www.irb.cornell.edu. You may also report your concerns or complaints anonymously through Ethicspoint (www.hotline.cornell.edu) or by calling toll free at 1-866-293-3077. Ethicspoint is an independent organization that serves as a liaison between the University and the person bringing the complaint so that anonymity can be ensured.

#### Figure A1. Recruitment HIT for the Bonus Game.

In order to log in, you need to have cookies enabled in your browser. <u>Click here to check if</u> cookies are enabled. Welcome to the Bonus Game! Please enter below your MTurk Worker ID. You can find your MTurk Worker ID under "Your Account" tab in Amazon MTurk. MTurk Worker ID Submit	In order to log in, you need to have cookies enabled in your browser. <u>Click here to check if</u> cookies are enabled. Welcome to the Bonus Game! Please enter below your MTurk Worker ID. You can find your MTurk Worker ID under "Your Account" tab in Amazon MTurk. MTurk Worker ID Submit	In order to log in, you need to have cookies enabled in your browser. <u>Click here to check if cookies are enabled</u> .  Melcome to the Bonus Game!  Please enter below your MTurk Worker ID. You can find your MTurk Worker ID under "Your Account" tab in Amazon MTurk.  MTurk Worker ID	ornell University		Social Dynamics Laboratory
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Submit	Submit	Submit	MTurk Worker	D	
				Submit	

Figure A2. Login page for the Bonus Game.

First, please answer a short standard demu does not affect your participation in the Bo below only once we have collected all results a truthfully. If you do not want to answer a part answer.	ographic survey. This survey is optional and nus Game. We will use the answers you provide and completed the study. Hence, please answer icular question, please do not select/write an	
Survey		
What is your gender?		
What is your age?		
What is the highest level of education you have completed?		
What is the total income of your household?		
What is your religious affiliation?		
What is your ethnicity?	<b>v</b>	
What is your nationality?	<b>-</b>	

Figure A3. Survey for the Bonus Game.

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The next five screer At the end, you will bonus and play the questions correctly.	ns explain the rules of the Bonus Game need to answer five questions that te game only if you do not take more tha	e. Please read the g est your understand in three attempts t	jame rules carefully. Jing. You will earn a o answer all five
How the Bo	nus Game Works (1/5)	)	
Each turker who s bonus of \$0.50. T	uccessfully completes the quiz at he turker then joins a chain of par	the end of the ins ticipants.	structions earns a
	previous participant	you	next participant
	<b>X</b>	Â	Ň
earned bonu	us + \$0.50	+ \$0.50	+ \$0.50
			Next

Figure A4. Page 1 of instructions for the Bonus Game.



Figure A5. Page 2 of instructions for the Bonus Game.



Figure A6. Page 3 of instructions for the Bonus Game.

<section-header><text><text><text></text></text></text></section-header>				Social Dynamics Labor
The total payment that each participant X on the chain receives at the end is estimated according to the following formula: total payment = HIT base rate and participant fransferred from participant X + 80.50 + 20.50 if previous participant transferred from participant X + 80.50 + 2 if participant X transfers from next participant X + 80.50 + 2 if participant X transfers from next participant X + 80.50 + 2 if participant X + 80.50	How the Bonus G	ame Works (4/5)		
The total payment that each participant X on the chain receives at the end is estimated according to the following formula:Used payment = HIT base rate and participant free of \$1.00 + earned bonus of \$0.50 + \$0.50 if previous participant transferred from participant X transfers from next participant 		(,,,,		
total payment = HIT base rate and participation fee of \$1.00 + earned bonus of \$0.50 - \$0.50 if previous participant transferred from participant X transfers from next participantprevious participant X transfers from next participantyou next participantyou next participantwou next participantyou next participantyou next participantin previous participantin previous participantin previous participantin previous participantin previous partic	The total payment that ea according to the following	ach participant X on the chair ) formula:	n receives at the	e end is estimated
bonus of \$0.50 - \$0.50 if previous participant transferred from participant X + \$0.50 $\div$ 2 if participant X transfers from next participant previous participant you next participant previous parti	total payment = H	IT base rate and participa	tion fee of \$1.	00 + earned
previous participant you next participant previous participant you next participant previous participant you next participant (-2) $(-3)$ $($	bonus of \$0.50 - \$0. + \$0.50 ÷ 2	50 if previous participant t if participant X transfers	ransferred fro	om participant X icipant
$ \begin{array}{c}                                     $		previous participant	you	next participant
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			-	
earned bonus $+$ \$0.50 $+$ \$0.50 $+$ \$0.50 $\Rightarrow$ transfer $+$ \$0.25 $+$ \$0.25 $+$ \$0.25 $+$ \$0.25 $+$ \$1.00 total payment \$1.25		T	T	T
earned bonus $+$ \$0.50 $+$ \$0.50 $+$ \$0.50 $\div$ transfer $\div$ $2$ $-$ \$0.50 $\div$ $2$ $-$ \$0.50 $\clubsuit$ generated bonus $+$ \$0.25 $\leftrightarrow$ $+$ \$0.25 $\leftrightarrow$ HIT base rate + participation fee $+$ \$1.00 total payment \$1.25		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
transfer $\Rightarrow$ transfer $\Rightarrow$ generated bonus HIT base rate + participation fee $\Rightarrow$ \$0.25 $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ \$0.50 $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ \$0.50 $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ \$0.25 $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ $\Rightarrow$ \$0.25 $\Rightarrow$ \$0.2	earned bonus	+ \$0.50	+ \$0.50	+ \$0.50
generated bonus    + \$0.25    + \$0.25      HIT base rate + participation fee    + \$1.00      total payment    \$1.25	transfer	(÷2)-	\$0.50	-2) \$0.50
HIT base rate + participation fee + \$1.00 total payment \$1.25	generated bonus	+ \$0.25	+ \$0.25 🔶	1
total payment \$1.25	HIT base rate + par	ticipation fee	+ \$1.00	
	total payment		\$1.25	-
	generated bonus HIT base rate + par total payment	+ \$0.25	+ \$0.25 + \$1.00	-

Figure A7. Page 4 of instructions for the Bonus Game.

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How the Bonus G	ame Works (5/5)		
The next participant also fat transfer the earned bonus	aces the same choice: he/ of the participant after to l	she needs to decid himself/herself or i	de whether to not.
	previous participant	you	next participant
	Ż	Å	<u> </u>
earned bonus	+ \$0.50	+ \$0.50	+ \$0.50
transfer	(÷2)		— - \$0.50
generated bonus	+ \$0.25	+ \$0.25	?
(¢)			·
Previous			Next

Figure A8. Page 5 of instructions for the Bonus Game.

CON CON	Social D	ynamics Laboratory
	Now, please answer the following questions about the game rules. You are allowed three attempts to answer the five questions correctly. If you answer the questions correctly within three attempts, you will earn a bonus of \$0.50 on top of the \$0.50 HIT base rate and the \$0.50 participation fee and participate in the game. If you fail to do so, you will not be allowed to proceed to play the game and you will only be paid the \$0.50 HIT base rate.	
	Quiz	
	1. What are the two possible amounts that the previous participant can transfer from your earned bonus?	
	2. What are the two possible amounts that can be added to your payment as a result of your transferring decision?	
	3. If the previous participant did not transfer your earned bonus and you decide not to transfer the next participant's earned bonus, what is the total payment that you will receive?	
	4. If the previous participant did not transfer your earned bonus but you decide to transfer the next participant's earned bonus, what is the total payment that you will receive?	
	5. If the previous participant transferred your earned bonus but you decide not to transfer the next participant's earned bonus, what is the total payment that you will receive?	
	······································	

Figure A9. Quiz for the Bonus Game.

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Congratuli Game.	tions! You completed the quiz successfully. It is now your turn to play the Bonus
Your	furn
	You just earned \$0.50 for successfully completing the quiz.
₹	Did the previous participant transfer from you? (Click to find out)
	The previous participant on your chain, turker *D7*D****D9*DW*, elected to transfer your earned bonus to himself/herself. As a result, you will be paid \$1.00 + \$0.50 - \$0.50 = \$1.00.
Ϋ́Ϋ́	What did other participants do? (Click to find out)
	50% of the turkers who participated in four other chains chose to transfer the next participants' earned bonus to themselves and 50% chose NOT to transfer the next participants' earned bonus.
?	What are your options? (Click to find out)
	Would you like to transfer the earned bonus of the participant after you or not? If you choose not to transfer the next participant's earned bonus, your current payment will not change and the next participant will receive his/her earned bonus. If you choose to transfer the next participant's earned bonus, \$0.50 will be subtracted from the next participant's payment, divided by 2, and you will receive \$0.25 as an additional bonus.
First, to n summarize	ake sure that you have clicked on, read, and understood the information above, please it in 1-2 sentences:
Now, plea	se make your decision.
0	I TRANSFER the next participant's earned bonus to myself. I DO NOT TRANSFER the next participant's earned bonus to myself.
	Submit

Figure A10. Decision page for a link in the observation condition in the Bonus Game.



Figure A11. Final page in the Bonus Game.

#### 2. Additional information and analyses

To improve the internal validity of the study, we required participants to answer correctly five multiple-choice questions that tested their comprehension of the game rules. Participants were allowed three attempts (two mistakes) to answer the quiz in order to be able to participate. The quiz required simple mathematical operations and was thus also intended to convince participants that they had earned their payment, rather than received it as a gift, with the ultimate goal of strengthening the incentives. 1,198 AMT users attempted to answer the quiz and 438 did not manage to do so within the allowed number of attempts (failure rate of 36.6 percent).

Figure A1 shows the power analysis used to determine the number of seeds (and hence, chains) in the game. The total sample size from the test represents the desired number of seeds in the no-observation condition and half of the desired number of seeds in the observation condition (since we wanted to test the effects of both low and high observation). The test suggested about 150 chains for a power level of around 0.9, assuming a transfer level of 50 percent in the no-observation condition and a relatively large effect size from observation.

Table A2 shows the distribution of participants in the observation/no-observation and seed/link treatments.

Table A3 tests for a difference in the effect of experiencing a loss between seeds and links. The difference is not statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 0.88$ , p = 0.349).

Table A4 shows detailed demographics for the participant sample. Participants had a mean age of 30.4 (ranging from 18 to 67), were 37.3 percent female, and had a median household income of \$40,000–\$49,999. The sample consisted of 72.3 percent U.S. citizens and 24.2 percent Indian citizens, with the remaining participants being from other countries. The most common ethnicities were white (60.9 percent) and Asian (25.1 percent). 22.8 percent reported being non-religious and 19.3 percent atheists, while Christianity was the most common religion. 7.1 percent reported educational attainment of high school or less, 32.8 percent some college or an associate's degree, and 60.2 percent a bachelor's or graduate degree.

Table A5 uses the demographic data to predict the log-odds that the participant transfers.



**Figure A1. Power analysis for the number of seeds in the Bonus Game.** The analysis is for a two-sample proportions test assuming a transfer proportion of 0.5 in the no-observation condition, and a significance level of 0.05.

		Seeds	Links	Total
No observation		50	200	250
Observation	Low observation High observation	50 50	200 200	250 250
Total		150	600	750

## Table A2. Number of participants by experimental treatment.

	Coefficient (s.e.)
Loss	1.542 (0.837)
Link	-0.518 (0.470)
Link * Loss	- 0.060 (0.909)
Constant	0.598 (0.375)
Number of observations	250
LR $\chi^2$	3 df, 21.58**

# Table A3. Differences between links and seeds in the log odds of transfer from the nextparticipant.

Two-sided tests: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01

The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from logistic regression for participants in the no-observation treatment. Results do not show a statistically significant difference in the effect of experiencing a loss between seeds and links.

Characteristic	Mean/ Percent
Female	37.33
Age	30.42 (SD=8.80)
Income	
Less than \$10,000	16.69
\$10,000-\$19,999	12.89
\$20,000-\$29,999	13.84
\$30,000-\$39,999	13 70
\$40,000-\$49,999	10.31
\$50,000-\$59,999	6.65
\$60,000-\$69,999	6.65
\$70,000-\$79,999	4.48
\$80,000-\$89,999	3 53
\$90,000 \$99,999	3.93
\$100,000-\$149,999	5 29
\$150,000 or More	2.04
Education	2.01
Less than High School	0.27
High School or GED	6.82
Some College	25.80
Associate's Degree	6.95
Bachelor's Degree	43.18
Graduate Degree (Master's, Doctorate, etc.)	16.98
Nationality	
United States	72.29
India	24.23
Other	3.48
Ethnicity	
White non-Hispanic	60.86
Asian/Pacific Islander	25.07
African-American	3.89
Hispanic	3.08
Native American	0.67
Other	6.43
Religion	
Non-religious	22.82
Atheist	19.33
Hindu	19.06
Protestant	10.87
Roman Catholic	10.47
Other Christian	10.74
Muslim	2.28
Jewish.	1.48
Buddhist	1.21
Other non-Christian	1.74

# Table A4. Detailed demographics for the participant sample.

	Coefficient (s.e.)
Age	- 0.009 (0.009)
Female	-0.617** (0.167)
Income	0.000 (0.000)
Education: Associate's or some college	0.157 (0.330)
Education: Bachelor's or graduate degree	0.292 (0.321)
Religion: Hindu	0.934* (0.407)
Religion: other non-Christian	0.153 (0.356)
Religion: non-religious	-0.280 (0.222)
Religion: atheist	-0.267 (0.234)
Nationality: India	-0.662 (0.442)
Nationality: other	0.222 (0.464)
Ethnicity: Asian or Pacific Islander	0.219 (0.310)
Ethnicity: other non-white	-0.076 (0.260)
Constant	0.893** (0.327)
Number of observations	745
$LR \chi^2$	13 df, 29.65**

## Table A5. Demographic differences in log odds of transfer.

Two-sided tests: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01

The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from logistic regression with a baseline of a thirty-year-old white, U.S., Christian male with a high school education or less and household income of less than \$10,000. Results show that females are less prone to antisocial behavior.